LEADER 04426nam 22005895 450 001 9910300619003321 005 20230124200432.0 010 $a3-030-02218-8 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-030-02218-1 035 $a(CKB)4100000007110545 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5583599 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-030-02218-1 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL5583599 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11636393 035 $a(OCoLC)1066189874 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000007110545 100 $a20181102d2018 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 13$aAn Epistemic Foundation for Scientific Realism $eDefending Realism Without Inference to the Best Explanation /$fby John Wright 205 $a1st ed. 2018. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2018. 215 $a1 online resource (224 pages) 225 1 $aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,$x0166-6991 ;$v402 311 $a3-030-02217-X 327 $aChapter 1. Introduction: Realism and Reason -- Chapter 2. The Skeptical Arguments Against Realism? 1: Inductive Skepticism -- Chapter 3. The Skeptical Arguments ? 2: The Pessimistic Meta-Induction -- Chapter 4. Realism and Inference to the Best Explanation -- Chapter 5. On the Inference to Unobservables -- Chapter 6. Underdetermination and Theory Preference -- Chapter 7. Eddington Inferences in Science ? 1: Atoms and Molecules -- Chapter 8. Eddington Inferences in Science ? 2: The Size and Shape of the Universe -- Bibliography. 330 $aThis monograph develops a new way of justifying the claims made by science about phenomenon not directly observable by humans, such as atoms and black holes. It details a way of making inferences to the existence and properties of unobservable entities and states of affairs that can be given a probabilistic justification. The inferences used to establish realist claims are not a form of, and neither do they rely on, inference to the best explanation. Scientific Realism maintains that scientific theories and hypotheses refer to real entities, forces, and relations, even if one cannot examine them. But, there are those who doubt these claims. The author develops a novel way of defending Scientific Realism against a range of influential attacks. He argues that in some cases, at least, we can make probabilistically justifiable inferences from observed data to claims about unobservable, theoretical entities. He shows how this enables us to place some scientific realist claims on a firmer epistemological footing than has previously been the case. This also makes it possible to give a unified set of replies to the most common objections to Scientific Realism. The final chapters apply the developed conceptual apparatus to key cases from the history of science and from recent science. One example concerns realism with respect to atoms. Another looks at inferences from recent astronomical data to conclusions about the size and shape of those parts of the universe lying beyond that which we can observe. 410 0$aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,$x0166-6991 ;$v402 606 $aPhilosophy and science 606 $aMathematical physics 606 $aChemistry, Physical and theoretical 606 $aPhilosophy of Science$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E34000 606 $aTheoretical, Mathematical and Computational Physics$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/P19005 606 $aTheoretical and Computational Chemistry$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/C25007 615 0$aPhilosophy and science. 615 0$aMathematical physics. 615 0$aChemistry, Physical and theoretical. 615 14$aPhilosophy of Science. 615 24$aTheoretical, Mathematical and Computational Physics. 615 24$aTheoretical and Computational Chemistry. 676 $a501 700 $aWright$b John$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0174495 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910300619003321 996 $aAn Epistemic Foundation for Scientific Realism$92174100 997 $aUNINA