LEADER 03718nam 22005775 450 001 9910300506903321 005 20200630112323.0 010 $a3-319-73948-4 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-319-73948-9 035 $a(CKB)3840000000347749 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5287943 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-319-73948-9 035 $a(PPN)238485358 035 $a(EXLCZ)993840000000347749 100 $a20180210d2018 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $2rdacontent 182 $2rdamedia 183 $2rdacarrier 200 10$aBeyond the Turnout Paradox $eThe Political Economy of Electoral Participation /$fby Luis Fernando Medina Sierra 205 $a1st ed. 2018. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2018. 215 $a1 online resource (93 pages) $cillustrations, tables 225 1 $aSpringerBriefs in Political Science,$x2191-5466 311 $a3-319-73947-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aChapter 1:  Beyond the Voter's Paradox --  Chapter 2: A General Model of Strategic Voting --  Chapter 3: The Stability Analysis of Voting Games --  Chapter 4: Electoral Participation Bias and the Welfare State --  Chapter 5: Toward a Structural Theory of Turnout. 330 $aThis Brief uses game-theoretic analysis to debunk the turnout paradox and offers an alternative economic model to elucidate the patterns behind the socioeconomic bias in turnout. The author argues that the turnout paradox?the idea that rational, strategic actors would not vote in an election?is an overstated problem, and that, contrary to widespread belief, game-theoretic models of elections with highly realistic parameters are compatible with high turnout. The author applies the method of stability sets to the study of voting games so as to characterize the behavior of electoral turnout in response to the game?s structural parameters. To illustrate the power and potential of this framework, the author then develops a politico-economic model that generates testable theories about the way in which the modern welfare state and redistribution of wealth can shape the patterns of biased turnout that exist in most democracies. By turning a classic problem of rational choice into a source of new methods of analysis this Brief allows game theory to intervene in relevant conversations about the political economy of electoral participation, creating an opportunity for formal methods to make a welcome contribution to the discipline. As such, this Brief will be of use to scholars and student of political science, economics, political economy, and public policy, especially those who work in the tradition of formal methods.   . 410 0$aSpringerBriefs in Political Science,$x2191-5466 606 $aElections 606 $aGame theory 606 $aPolitical theory 606 $aElectoral Politics$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/911070 606 $aGame Theory$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W29020 606 $aPolitical Theory$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/911010 615 0$aElections. 615 0$aGame theory. 615 0$aPolitical theory. 615 14$aElectoral Politics. 615 24$aGame Theory. 615 24$aPolitical Theory. 676 $a324.9 700 $aMedina Sierra$b Luis Fernando$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0895214 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910300506903321 996 $aBeyond the Turnout Paradox$92000071 997 $aUNINA