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024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9
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035   $a(DE-He213)978-3-319-65268-9
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100   $a20180124d2018      u|         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurnn|008mamaa
181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 10$aEconomic Analysis of Contract Law $eIncomplete Contracts and Asymmetric Information /$fby Sugata Bag
205   $a1st ed. 2018.
210  1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,$d2018.
215   $a1 online resource (XVI, 203 p. 2 illus. in color.) 
311   $a3-319-65267-2 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $a1. Introduction -- 2. Basics of Economic Theory of Contract -- 3. Economics of Damage Remedies I: Unilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry -- 4. Economics of Damage Remedies II: Bilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry -- 5. Economics of Damage Remedies III: Incentives Under Expectation Damage With One-Sided Private Information ?A Mechanism Design Approach -- 6. Economics of Damage Remedies IV: Incomplete Contracts, Bilateral Reliance, Two-Sided Asymmetric Information -- 7. Concluding Notes.
330   $aThis book examines the main issues arising in economic analysis of contract law with special attention given to the incomplete contracts. It discusses both the main features of contract law as they relate to the problem of economic exchange, and how the relevant legal rules and the institutions can be analysed from an economic perspective. Evaluate the welfare impacts, analyses the effects and the desirability of different breach remedies and examines the optimal incentive structure of party-designed liquidated damages under the different dimensions of informational asymmetry. Overall the book aims to contribute to the legal debate over the adoption of the specific breach remedies when the breach victim?s expectation interest is difficult to assess, and to the debate over courts' reluctance to implement large penalties in the event of breach of contracts.
606   $aLaw and economics
606   $aPublic finance
606   $aCommercial law
606   $aLaw and Economics$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W39000
606   $aPublic Economics$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W34000
606   $aBusiness Law$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/529000
615  0$aLaw and economics.
615  0$aPublic finance.
615  0$aCommercial law.
615 14$aLaw and Economics.
615 24$aPublic Economics.
615 24$aBusiness Law.
676   $a330
700   $aBag$b Sugata$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$01057905
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910299658203321
996   $aEconomic Analysis of Contract Law$92495412
997   $aUNINA