LEADER 03935nam 22006975 450 001 9910299055703321 005 20200706104616.0 010 $a3-319-06799-0 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-319-06799-5 035 $a(CKB)3710000000118040 035 $a(EBL)1731147 035 $a(OCoLC)883370015 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001237504 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11706001 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001237504 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11249760 035 $a(PQKB)10869736 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1731147 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-319-06799-5 035 $a(PPN)178780936 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000118040 100 $a20140520d2014 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aAuction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market /$fby Peng Lin, Xiaojun Feng, Qian Zhang 205 $a1st ed. 2014. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2014. 215 $a1 online resource (92 p.) 225 1 $aSpringerBriefs in Computer Science,$x2191-5768 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a3-319-06798-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters. 327 $aIntroduction -- Auction Mechanisms -- Truthful Double Auction Mechanism for Heterogeneous Spectrums -- Spectrum Group-buying Framework -- Flexauc Auction: Serving Dynamic Demand in Wireless Markets -- Conclusions. 330 $aThis Brief introduces the wireless spectrum market and discusses the current research for spectrum auctions. It covers the unique properties of spectrum auction, such as interference relationship, reusability, divisibility, composite effect and marginal effect, while also proposing how to build economic incentives into the network architecture and protocols in order to optimize the efficiency of wireless systems. Three scenarios for designing new auctions are demonstrated. First, a truthful double auction scheme for spectrum trading considering both the heterogeneous propagation properties of channels and spatial reuse is proposed. In the second scenario, a framework is designed to enable spectrum group secondary users with a limited budget. Finally, a flexible auction is created enabling operators to purchase the right amounts of spectrum at the right prices according to their users? dynamic demands. Both concise and comprehensive, Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market is suited for professionals and researchers working with wireless communications and networks. It is also a useful tool for advanced-level students interested in spectrum and networking issues. 410 0$aSpringerBriefs in Computer Science,$x2191-5768 606 $aComputer networks 606 $aElectrical engineering 606 $aGame theory 606 $aComputer Communication Networks$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/I13022 606 $aCommunications Engineering, Networks$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/T24035 606 $aGame Theory$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W29020 615 0$aComputer networks. 615 0$aElectrical engineering. 615 0$aGame theory. 615 14$aComputer Communication Networks. 615 24$aCommunications Engineering, Networks. 615 24$aGame Theory. 676 $a621.382 700 $aLin$b Peng$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0868575 702 $aFeng$b Xiaojun$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut 702 $aZhang$b Qian$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910299055703321 996 $aAuction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market$91938836 997 $aUNINA