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100   $a20130705d2014      uy         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aFinancial stability policy in the Euro Zone $ethe political economy of national banking regulation in an integrating monetary union /$fGundbert Scherf
205   $a1st ed. 2014.
210   $aWiesbaden ;$aNew York $cSpringer$dc2014
215   $a1 online resource (273 p.)
300   $aOriginally presented as the author's doctoral thesis--Freie Universitat Berlin, 2012.
311   $a3-658-04213-3 
311   $a3-658-00982-9 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $aA Political Economy Perspective on European Banking Regulation -- Varieties of Financial Systems and Regulatory Preferences -- Banking Regulation in an Integrating Financial Market -- Time Consistency Problems in the Interaction of Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy.
330   $aBanking regulation is an economically powerful and politically very salient instrument of economic policy. After all, the financial crisis had derived from an over-leveraged banking system obviating the importance of banking regulation for the functioning of regulatory capitalism. Gundbert Scherf?s research focuses on this nexus between integrated banking, supranational monetary policy and national banking regulation. He finds that national level differences in financial systems and related institutions explain and drive variation in regulatory financial stability policy across countries. Applying game-theoretical rigor to political economy interactions, Gundbert Scherf develops a model of time-inconsistent supervisory policy as well as international competition in regulatory standards. He shows how these patterns lead to financial instability, by analyzing the original members of the Euro Zone as well as the US and the UK in the years leading up to the financial crisis of 2007/8.     Contents ·         Varieties of financial systems and regulatory preferences ·         Banking regulation in an integrating financial market ·         Interaction of banking supervision and monetary policy ·         Time consistency problems in supervisory policy      Target Groups ·         Researchers and students in the fields of economics, political economy, and finance interested in financial systems, regulation and supervisory policy ·         Central bankers, regulators, and executives in banking and finance    The Author Dr. Gundbert Scherf wrote his dissertation under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Henrik Enderlein, Chair of Political Economy, at the Freie Universität Berlin.
606   $aBanks and banking, Central$zEuropean Union countries
606   $aMonetary unions$zEuropean Union countries
607   $aEurozone
615  0$aBanks and banking, Central
615  0$aMonetary unions
676   $a339.5094
700   $aScherf$b Gundbert$01061638
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910298521003321
996   $aFinancial Stability Policy in the Euro Zone$92519418
997   $aUNINA