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010   $a81-322-2029-3
024 7 $a10.1007/978-81-322-2029-9
035   $a(CKB)3710000000311829
035   $a(EBL)1966210
035   $a(OCoLC)897466475
035   $a(SSID)ssj0001407887
035   $a(PQKBManifestationID)11876789
035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001407887
035   $a(PQKBWorkID)11413031
035   $a(PQKB)10010397
035   $a(DE-He213)978-81-322-2029-9
035   $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1966210
035   $a(PPN)183148150
035   $a(EXLCZ)993710000000311829
100   $a20141201d2015      u|         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aEconomic Analysis of Liability Rules$b[electronic resource] /$fby Satish Kumar Jain
205   $a1st ed. 2015.
210  1$aNew Delhi :$cSpringer India :$cImprint: Springer,$d2015.
215   $a1 online resource (184 p.)
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a81-322-2028-5 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $aChapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Efficiency Criteria -- Chapter 3. The Structure of Efficient Liability Rules -- Chapter 4. Decoupled Liability and Efficiency -- Chapter 5. Negligence as Failure to Take Some Cost-Justified Precaution -- Chapter 6. The Structure of Incremental Liability Rules -- Chapter 7. The Negligence Rule -- Chapter 8. Decomposition of Loss and a Class of Negligence Rules -- Chapter 9. Multiple Injurers and Victims -- Chapter 10. Epilogue.
330   $aThis book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency. The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled.
606   $aLaw and economics
606   $aCivil procedure
606   $aCriminal law
606   $aEconomics
606   $aLaw and Economics$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W39000
606   $aCivil Procedure Law$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/R12034
606   $aCriminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/R13006
606   $aEconomic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W29000
615  0$aLaw and economics.
615  0$aCivil procedure.
615  0$aCriminal law.
615  0$aEconomics.
615 14$aLaw and Economics.
615 24$aCivil Procedure Law.
615 24$aCriminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law.
615 24$aEconomic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.
676   $a330
676   $a330.1
676   $a345
676   $a347.05
700   $aJain$b Satish Kumar$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0781850
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910298493903321
996   $aEconomic Analysis of Liability Rules$92546072
997   $aUNINA