LEADER 04033 am 2200925 n 450 001 9910279591803321 005 20180215 010 $a2-9564470-6-8 024 7 $a10.4000/books.irasec.498 035 $a(CKB)4100000004910766 035 $a(FrMaCLE)OB-irasec-498 035 $a(oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/41770 035 $a(PPN)230000495 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000004910766 100 $a20180703j|||||||| ||| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $auu||||||m|||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aBack to Old Habits $eIsolationism or the Self-Preservation of Burma?s Military Regime /$fRenaud Egreteau, Larry Jagan 210 $aBangkok $cInstitut de recherche sur l?Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine$d2018 215 $a1 online resource (92 p.) 330 $aThis book argues that the Burmese military regime has always favoured an isolationist-type policy that finds its grassroots in Ne Win?s autarchic and xenophobic era as well as in Burma?s royal traditions, but without being completely cut off from the outside world. This policy approach is well suited to the Burmese authoritarian state which boasts an important strategic position in the region. In the past decade, the politics of ?isolationism without isolation? has been skilfully developed by Burma?s military elite in order to preserve itself from both internal and external threats. Since the Depayin crackdown in May 2003, every step the Burmese junta has taken indicates that it has been consciously defining both its foreign policy and its internal political agenda according to these isolationist tendencies, as the recent fallbacks that followed the ?Saffron Revolution? (September 2007) and the Cyclone Nargis (May 2008) illustrate. Not only does the military regime tend to strategically withdraw itself from the regional scene, by choosing only a few but crucial diplomatic and commercial partners like China, India, Singapore, Russia or Thailand, but it also gradually isolates itself from the rest of the Burmese society, by opting for a strategic and nationalist entrenchment which was perfectly highlighted by the purge of the pragmatic Military Intelligence Services (2004), the transfer of the capital to Naypyidaw (2005) and the strict control over the transitional process initiated by its own ?Road Map towards a disciplined democracy? and undisrupted by the recent crises. 606 $aAsian Studies 606 $adémocratie 606 $aliberté 606 $aarmée 606 $asociété civile 606 $arégime 606 $apolitical transition 606 $atransition politique 606 $aMyanmar 606 $aBurma 606 $aBirmanie 606 $ajunte 606 $atatmadaw 606 $aautarcie 606 $ademocracy 606 $afreedom 606 $aCivil Society 606 $aarmy 606 $ajunta 606 $aautarchy 607 $aBurma$xPolitics and government$y1988- 607 $aBurma$xForeign relations$y1948- 610 $aarmy 610 $aCivil Society 610 $afreedom 610 $aautarchy 610 $ajunta 610 $ademocracy 615 4$aAsian Studies 615 4$adémocratie 615 4$aliberté 615 4$aarmée 615 4$asociété civile 615 4$arégime 615 4$apolitical transition 615 4$atransition politique 615 4$aMyanmar 615 4$aBurma 615 4$aBirmanie 615 4$ajunte 615 4$atatmadaw 615 4$aautarcie 615 4$ademocracy 615 4$afreedom 615 4$aCivil Society 615 4$aarmy 615 4$ajunta 615 4$aautarchy 700 $aEgreteau$b Renaud$01235894 701 $aJagan$b Larry$01235895 712 02$aIRASEC. 801 0$bFR-FrMaCLE 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910279591803321 996 $aBack to Old Habits$93028626 997 $aUNINA