LEADER 04290oam 22007334a 450 001 9910255446503321 005 20240416120757.0 010 $a0-8014-5490-5 010 $a0-8014-5491-3 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801454912 035 $a(CKB)3710000000271215 035 $a(OCoLC)894227715 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10961888 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001369506 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12554169 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001369506 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11288230 035 $a(PQKB)10854860 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001516651 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse37656 035 $a(DE-B1597)478388 035 $a(OCoLC)979590348 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801454912 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138670 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10961888 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL751607 035 $a(OCoLC)922998607 035 $a(ScCtBLL)e3f60279-3139-46a9-a68a-3d8fe1773b42 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138670 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000271215 100 $a20140219d2014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aCorruption as a Last Resort$eAdapting to the Market in Central Asia /$fKelly M. McMann 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aIthaca :$cCornell University Press,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014. 215 $a1 online resource (201 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a1-336-20321-8 311 $a0-8014-5327-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aAn absence of alternatives : a new framework for understanding corruption -- Alternatives to corruption and the impact of market reform : the arguments and their theoretical implications -- Bribery, favoritism, and clientelism : evidence from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan -- Market actors as an unrealized alternative : the impact of market reforms -- Islamic institutions and secular charities : obstacles to providing substitute resources -- Families : the uneven impact of market reforms -- Reducing corruption : policy recommendations -- Appendix : statistical analysis. 330 $aWhy do ordinary people engage in corruption? Kelly M. McMann contends that bureaucrats, poverty, and culture do not force individuals in Central Asia to pay bribes, use connections, or sell political support. Rather, corruption is a last resort when relatives, groups in society, the market, and formal government programs cannot provide essential goods and services. Using evidence from her long-term research in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, McMann shows that Islamic institutions, secular charities, entrepreneurs, and banks cannot provide the jobs and credit people need. This drives individuals to illicitly seek employment and loans from government officials.A leading cause of this resource scarcity is market reform, as demonstrated by McMann's analysis of these countries as well as of Uzbekistan and global data. Market reform without supporting institutions, such as credit registries and antimonopoly measures, limits the resources available from the market and societal groups. McMann finds that in these circumstances only those individuals who have affluent relatives have an alternative to corruption.By focusing on ordinary people, McMann offers a new understanding of corruption. Previously, our knowledge was largely restricted to government officials' role in illicit exchanges. From her novel approach comes a useful policy insight: supplying ordinary people with alternatives to corruption is a fundamental and important anticorruption strategy. 606 $aPost-communism$xEconomic aspects$zAsia, Central 606 $aPolitical corruption$zAsia, Central 606 $aCorruption$zAsia, Central 607 $aAsia, Central$xPolitics and government$y1991- 607 $aAsia, Central$xEconomic conditions$y1991- 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aPost-communism$xEconomic aspects 615 0$aPolitical corruption 615 0$aCorruption 676 $a381.3 700 $aMcMann$b Kelly M.$f1970-$0849501 801 0$bMdBmJHUP 801 1$bMdBmJHUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910255446503321 996 $aCorruption as a last resort$92148546 997 $aUNINA