LEADER 01253nam2-2200385li-450 001 990000195060203316 005 20240315095326.0 010 $a0-387-94328-5 035 $a0019506 035 $aUSA010019506 035 $a(ALEPH)000019506USA01 035 $a0019506 100 $a20001109d1994----km-y0itay0103----ba 101 0 $aeng 102 $aGW 200 1 $aAdvanced topics in the arithmetic of elliptic curves$fJoseph H. Silverman 210 $aBerlin [etc.]$cSpringer-Verlag$dcopyr. 1994 215 $aVII, 360 p.$cill.$d23 cm 225 2 $aGraduate texts in mathematics$v151 410 0$1001000315347$12001$aGraduate texts in mathematics$v151 610 1 $acurve algebriche 610 1 $acurve ellittiche 676 $a516352$9Curve e superfici su piani proiettivi 700 1$aSilverman,$bJoseph H.$057147 801 $aSistema bibliotecario di Ateneo dell' Universitŕ di Salerno$gRICA 912 $a990000195060203316 951 $a510 GTM (151)$b0019259 959 $aBK 969 $aSCI 979 $c19970122 979 $c20001110$lUSA01$h1713 979 $c20020403$lUSA01$h1627 979 $aPATRY$b90$c20040406$lUSA01$h1614 996 $aAdvanced topics in the arithmetic of elliptic curves$979424 997 $aUNISA LEADER 05532nam 22005655 450 001 9910255354603321 005 20251030103918.0 010 $a9781137326133 010 $a1137326131 024 7 $a10.1057/978-1-137-32613-3 035 $a(CKB)3710000000745812 035 $a(DE-He213)978-1-137-32613-3 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4720346 035 $a(Perlego)3486838 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000745812 100 $a20160705d2016 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurnn|008mamaa 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe Varieties of Self-Knowledge /$fby Annalisa Coliva 205 $a1st ed. 2016. 210 1$aLondon :$cPalgrave Macmillan UK :$cImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,$d2016. 215 $a1 online resource (XVI, 288 p.) 225 1 $aPalgrave Innovations in Philosophy,$x2946-286X 311 08$a9781137326126 311 08$a1137326123 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aAcknowledgments -- Credits -- List of abbreviations -- Introduction -- Chapter one: Varieties of Mental States -- 1. Sensations and perceptions -- The objectivity of perceptual representation -- Perceptual contents -- Sensory states and sensations -- 2. Two kinds of propositional attitudes: dispositions and commitments -- Propositional attitudes as dispositions -- Propositional attitudes as commitments -- 3. Emotions -- Emotions as sensations -- Emotions as evaluative judgments -- Emotions as felt bodily attitudes -- Emotions as perceptions of evaluative properties -- The borderline view of emotions -- 4. Summary -- Chapter two: Varieties of Self-Knowledge -- 1. First personal self-knowledge -- Groundlessness -- Transparency -- Authority -- 2. Counterexamples from content externalism and cognitive science? -- 3. Third-personal self-knowledge -- 4. Summary -- Chapter three: Epistemically Robust Accounts -- 1. Inner sense theories: Armstrong and Lycan -- 2. Inferential theories: Gopnik and Cassam -- 3. Simulation-theories: Goldman and Gordon -- 4. Summary -- Chapter four: Epistemically Weak Accounts -- 1. Peacocke?s rational internalism -- 2. Burge?s rational externalism -- 3. Evans? transparency method -- 3.1 Fernández? epistemic account -- 3.2 Moran?s deliberative account -- 4. Summary -- Chapter five: Expressivism about Self-Knowledge -- 1. At the origins of expressivism: Wittgenstein -- 2. Bar-On?s neo-expressivism -- 3. Summary -- Chapter six: Constitutive Theories -- 1. The left-to-right side of the Constitutive Thesis: Shoemaker -- 2. The right-to-left side of the Constitutive Thesis: Wright -- 3. The two sides of the Constitutive Thesis: Bilgrami -- 4. A metaphysically robust kind of constitutivism: Coliva -- The first half of the constitutive thesis: transparency -- Objections from empirical psychology -- The second half of the constitutive thesis: authority -- 5. Summary -- Chapter seven: Pluralism about Self-Knowledge -- 1. Propositional attitudes as commitments: the limits of constitutive accounts -- 2. Sensations, basic emotions and perceptions and perceptual experiences: constitutivism meets expressivism -- Sensations -- Basic emotions -- Perceptions and perceptual experiences -- 3. Propositional attitudes as dispositions and complex emotions: third-personal self-knowledge -- 4. Summary -- Appendix: Moore?s Paradox -- 1. Moorean and Wittgensteinian analyses -- 2. The constraints on any feasible account of Moore?s paradox -- 3. What Moore?s paradox isn?t about: Jane?s off case -- 4. What Moore?s paradox is about?first pass -- 5. What Moore?s paradox is about?second pass -- 6. An objection -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Name index -- Subject index. 330 $aThis book explores the idea that self-knowledge comes in many varieties. We ?know ourselves? through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call ?self-knowledge? is not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts. This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the epistemology of self-knowledge. These include robust epistemic accounts such as inner sense views and theory-theories; weak epistemic accounts such as transparency theories and rational internalism and externalism; as well as expressivist and constitutivist approaches. The author offers an innovative ?pluralist? position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of the phenomenon and its resistance to any ?monistic? treatment, to pose new and intriguing philosophical challenges. 410 0$aPalgrave Innovations in Philosophy,$x2946-286X 606 $aKnowledge, Theory of 606 $aPhilosophy of mind 606 $aEmotions 606 $aEpistemology 606 $aPhilosophy of Mind 606 $aEmotion 615 0$aKnowledge, Theory of. 615 0$aPhilosophy of mind. 615 0$aEmotions. 615 14$aEpistemology. 615 24$aPhilosophy of Mind. 615 24$aEmotion. 676 $a120 700 $aColiva$b Annalisa$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0568725 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910255354603321 996 $aThe Varieties of Self-Knowledge$92518866 997 $aUNINA