LEADER 06657nam 22007815 450 001 9910255347303321 005 20200704003207.0 010 $a1-137-54181-4 024 7 $a10.1057/9781137541819 035 $a(CKB)3710000000627430 035 $a(EBL)4460302 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001638995 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)16397448 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001638995 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)14815835 035 $a(PQKB)10740072 035 $a(DE-He213)978-1-137-54181-9 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4460302 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000627430 100 $a20160329d2016 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aRightness as Fairness$b[electronic resource] $eA Moral and Political Theory /$fby Marcus Arvan 205 $a1st ed. 2016. 210 1$aLondon :$cPalgrave Macmillan UK :$cImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,$d2016. 215 $a1 online resource (283 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-137-54180-6 311 $a1-349-71264-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aCover; Half-Title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; 1 Ethics for the Twenty-First Century; 1 Distinguishing truth from seeming truth; 2 Seven principles of theory selection; 2.1 Firm Foundations; 2.2 Internal Coherence; 2.3 External Coherence; 2.4 Explanatory Power; 2.5 Unity; 2.6 Parsimony; 2.7 Fruitfulness; 3 The case for instrumentalism; 3.1 The firmest foundation; 3.2 The promise of parsimony, unity, explanatory power, and fruitfulness; 3.3 Advantages over alternatives; 3.3.1 Advantages over intuitionism; 3.3.2 Advantages over reflective equilibrium 327 $a3.3.3 Advantages over moral language analysis3.3.4 Advantages over constitutivism; 3.3.5 Advantages over second- and third-personalism; 3.3.6 Advantages over Sterba's dialecticalism; 3.3.7 Conclusion; 4 Disarming initial concerns; 4.1 The wrong kinds of reasons?; 4.2 Not a firm foundation?; 4.3 Unconvincing and artificial?; 4.4 Three promissory notes; 4.4.1 Not the wrong kinds of reasons?; 4.4.2 Firm foundations after all?; 4.4.3 Intuitive and convincing?; 5 Conclusion; 2 The Problem of Possible Future Selves; 1 Our capacities to care about our past and future 327 $a2 The problem of possible future selves2.1 Possible futures; 2.2 Possible psychologies; 2.3 Possible choices; 2.4 A very real problem; 3 Morality as the solution?; 4 Is the problem too contingent?; 5 Two nonsolutions; 5.1 Nonsolution 1: probable futures; 5.2 Nonsolution 2: diachronic motivational consistency; 6 Conclusion: an unsolved problem; 3 The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative; 1 Interests in diachronic cooperation; 2 Three types of interests; 2.1 Involuntary interests; 2.2 Semivoluntary interests; 2.3 Voluntary interests; 3 The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative; 4 Just conscience? 327 $a5 An intuitive solution to the problem of possible future selves?6 Conclusion; 4 Three Unified Formulations; 1 The Humanity and Sentience Formulation; 1.1 Possible other-human-regarding interests; 1.2 Possible nonhuman-animal-regarding interests; 1.3 Possible sentient-being-regarding interests; 1.4 Derivation of the Humanity and Sentience Formulation; 2 The Kingdom of Human and Sentient Ends Formulation; 3 Advantages over Kantian ethics; 3.1 Firmer foundations; 3.2 Greater internal coherence; 3.3 Greater external coherence; 3.4 Greater explanatory power, unity, and parsimony 327 $a3.5 Greater fruitfulness4 Conclusion; 5 The Moral Original Position; 1 Rawls' Original Position; 1.1 Rawls' Kantian rationale; 1.2 Rawls' reflective equilibrium rationale; 1.3 Rawls' public reason rationale; 2 Some common critiques; 2.1 Kantian critiques; 2.2 Reflective equilibrium critiques; 2.3 Public reason critiques; 3 The case for a Moral Original Position; 4 Corroborating the critiques; 4.1 Corroborating Kantian critiques; 4.2 Corroborating reflective equilibrium critiques; 4.3 Corroborating public reason critiques; 5 Conclusion; 6 Rightness as Fairness 327 $a1 Derivation of Four Principles of Fairness 330 $aMoral philosophy today is marked by profound, systematic disagreement. In Rightness as Fairness, Marcus Arvan argues that the field of moral philosophy must adapt scientific principles in order to move closer to discovering moral truth. Arvan argues that our best empirical evidence and natural observation reveal morality to be a type of prudence requiring us to act in ways that our present and future selves can rationally agree upon across time. Arvan shows that this agreement between our present and future selves - Rightness as Fairness - is fundamentally a matter of being fair to ourselves and to others, including animals. Further, the Four Principles of Fairness comprising this agreement reconcile several opposing moral and political frameworks, including libertarianism and egalitarianism. Rightness as Fairness provides a uniquely fruitful method of 'principled fair negotiation' for resolving applied moral and political issues that requires merging principled debate with real-world negotiation. 606 $aPolitical philosophy 606 $aSocial sciences?Philosophy 606 $aPolitical theory 606 $aEthics 606 $aWorld politics 606 $aPolitical Philosophy$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E37000 606 $aSocial Philosophy$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E43000 606 $aPolitical Theory$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/911010 606 $aEthics$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E14000 606 $aMoral Philosophy$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E41000 606 $aPolitical History$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/911080 615 0$aPolitical philosophy. 615 0$aSocial sciences?Philosophy. 615 0$aPolitical theory. 615 0$aEthics. 615 0$aWorld politics. 615 14$aPolitical Philosophy. 615 24$aSocial Philosophy. 615 24$aPolitical Theory. 615 24$aEthics. 615 24$aMoral Philosophy. 615 24$aPolitical History. 676 $a100 700 $aArvan$b Marcus$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0904781 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910255347303321 996 $aRightness as Fairness$92543687 997 $aUNINA