LEADER 04205nam 22005775 450 001 9910255336503321 005 20230808192039.0 010 $a94-017-7387-4 024 7 $a10.1007/978-94-017-7387-4 035 $a(CKB)3710000000611358 035 $a(EBL)4428968 035 $a(DE-He213)978-94-017-7387-4 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4428968 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4428968 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11187498 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL902096 035 $a(OCoLC)945873530 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000611358 100 $a20160301d2016 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aWanting and Intending$b[electronic resource] $eElements of a Philosophy of Practical Mind /$fby Neil Roughley 205 $a1st ed. 2016. 210 1$aDordrecht :$cSpringer Netherlands :$cImprint: Springer,$d2016. 215 $a1 online resource (382 p.) 225 1 $aPhilosophical Studies Series,$x0921-8599 ;$v123 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a94-017-7385-8 327 $aAcknowledgments -- Introduction.-  Part 1. Wanting -- 1.  The Question of Motivational Unity: Historical Preliminaries -- 2.  Motivational States -- 3.  Wanting* and its Symptoms.-4.  Expressive Explication and the Optative Mode -- 5.  Wanting*, Consciousness and Affect -- Part 2. Intending -- 6.  Intention, Belief and Commitment -- 7.  The Intentional Syndrome: Characteristic Causal Features and Rational Requirements -- 8.  Deciding -- 9.  Intentions Decisional and Nondecisional -- 10. The Intention-Consequential Requirements and Anchoring Attributability -- Index. 330 $aThis book aims to answer two simple questions: what is it to want and what is it to intend? Because of the breadth of contexts in which the relevant phenomena are implicated and the wealth of views that have attempted to account for them, providing the answers is not quite so simple. Doing so requires an examination not only of the relevant philosophical theories and our everyday practices, but also of the rich empirical material that has been provided by work in social and developmental psychology. The investigation is carried out in two parts, dedicated to wanting and intending respectively. Wanting is analysed as optative attitudinising, a basic form of subjective standard-setting at the core of compound states such as 'longings', 'desires', 'projects' and 'whims'. The analysis is developed in the context of a discussion of Moore-paradoxicality and deepened through the examination of rival theories, which include functionalist and hedonistic conceptions as well as the guise-of-the-good view and the pure entailment approach, two views popular in moral psychology. In the second part of the study, a disjunctive genetic theory of intending is developed, according to which intentions are optative attitudes on which, in one way or another, the mark of deliberation has been conferred. It is this which explains intention's subjection to the requirements of practical rationality. Moreover, unlike wanting, intending turns out to be dependent on normative features of our life form, in particular on practices of holding responsible. The book will be of particular interest to philosophers and psychologists working on motivation, goals, desire, intention, deliberation, decision and practical rationality. 410 0$aPhilosophical Studies Series,$x0921-8599 ;$v123 606 $aPhilosophy of mind 606 $aEthics 606 $aPhilosophy of Mind$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E31000 606 $aEthics$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E14000 615 0$aPhilosophy of mind. 615 0$aEthics. 615 14$aPhilosophy of Mind. 615 24$aEthics. 676 $a100 700 $aRoughley$b Neil$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0154094 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910255336503321 996 $aWanting and Intending$92544350 997 $aUNINA