LEADER 03785nam 22005655 450 001 9910255253603321 005 20200703031239.0 010 $a9781137336644$belectronic bk. 010 $a1-137-33664-1 024 7 $a10.1057/9781137336644 035 $a(CKB)3710000000644957 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001652719 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)16427391 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001652719 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)13363190 035 $a(PQKB)11412632 035 $a(DE-He213)978-1-137-33664-4 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4720252 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000644957 100 $a20160412d2016 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurnn||||mamaa 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aMetaepistemology and Relativism$b[electronic resource] /$fby J. Carter 205 $a1st ed. 2016. 210 1$aLondon :$cPalgrave Macmillan UK :$cImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,$d2016. 215 $a1 online resource (xiv, 298 pages) 225 1 $aPalgrave Innovations in Philosophy 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 08$aPrint version: Carter, J. Adam, 1980- Metaepistemology and relativism. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England ; New York, New York : Palgrave Macmillan, c2016 xiv, 298 pages Palgrave innovations in philosophy. 9781137336637 2015032826 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aMetaepistemology and realism -- Global relativism -- The pyrrhonian argument for epistemic relativism -- Dialogic arguments for epistemic relativism -- Incommensurability, circularity, and epistemic relativism -- Replacement relativism: Boghossian, Kusch And Wright -- A different kind of epistemic relativism -- New relativism: epistemic aftermath -- Metaepistemology and relativism. 330 $aIs knowledge relative? Many academics across the humanities are happy to say that it is. However, those who work in mainstream epistemology, the philosophical theory of knowledge, generally take for granted that it is not. Metaepistemology and Relativism questions whether the kind of anti-relativistic background that underlies most typical projects in mainstream epistemology can on closer inspection be vindicated. To this end, prominent and diverse argument strategies for epistemic relativism are considered and criticised. It is shown that a common weakness of more traditional argument strategies for epistemic relativism is that they fail to decisively motivate relativism over scepticism. Interestingly, though, this style of objection cannot be effectively redeployed against the new (semantic) variety of epistemic relativism?itself introduced only in the past decade. Although new (semantic) epistemic relativism constitutes an entirely different kind of challenge to mainstream epistemology than traditional forms, the new variety itself faces a dilemma. Once the dilemma is appreciated, it will be shown that the threat to mainstream epistemology that epistemic relativism is best understood as posing is in fact a very different one than we'd be originally inclined to think. 410 0$aPalgrave Innovations in Philosophy 606 $aMusic 606 $aPhilosophy of mind 606 $aMusic$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/417000 606 $aPhilosophy of Mind$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E31000 615 0$aMusic. 615 0$aPhilosophy of mind. 615 14$aMusic. 615 24$aPhilosophy of Mind. 676 $a121 700 $aCarter$b J$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0487115 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910255253603321 996 $aMetaepistemology and Relativism$92526131 997 $aUNINA