LEADER 00964nam0-2200313---450- 001 990008384990403321 005 20101026160022.0 010 $a84-9747-045-1 035 $a000838499 035 $aFED01000838499 035 $a(Aleph)000838499FED01 035 $a000838499 100 $a20060926d2004----km-y0itay50------ba 101 0 $aspa 102 $aES 105 $a----a---001yy 200 1 $aAprendices, escépticos y curiosos en el renacimiento español$elos diálogos de Antonio de Torquemada$fRafael Malpartida Tirado 210 $aMalaga$cUniversidad de Malaga$d2004 215 $a330 p.$d21 cm 610 0 $aTorquemada, Antonio : de 676 $a868.3 700 1$aMalpartida Tirado,$bRafael$0295354 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990008384990403321 952 $a868.3 TORQ/S 2$fFLFBC 959 $aFLFBC 996 $aAprendices, escépticos y curiosos en el renacimiento español$9724901 997 $aUNINA LEADER 07618 am 22007453u 450 001 9910297054203321 005 20230621141359.0 010 $a3-631-75400-0 024 7 $a10.3726/b13920 035 $a(CKB)4100000007276924 035 $a(OAPEN)1003185 035 $a(oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/39275 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC30685986 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL30685986 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000007276924 100 $a20200114d20052005 fy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurmu#---auuuu 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aAgency theory $emethodology, analysis ; a structured approach to writing contracts /$fAlexander Stremitzer 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aBern$cPeter Lang International Academic Publishing Group$d2018 210 1$aFrankfurt am Main, Germany :$cPeter Lang,$d[2005] 210 31$dFrankfurt am Main, Germany :$cPeter Lang,$d[2018] 210 4$d©2005 215 $a1 online resource (various pagings) $cillustrations; digital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aForschungsergebnisse der Wirtschaftsuniversita?t Wien ;$vBand 3 311 08$aPrint version: 9783631529737 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aCover -- I INTRODUCTION -- 1 The Contracting Problem -- 2 Applications -- 3 Models of Contracting -- 4 Obsession with Modeling Single Effects -- 5 Methodological Reflection -- 6 A Note to the Reader -- II EPISTEMIC PROBLEMS AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE -- 1 Overview -- 2 The Objectives of Science -- 3 What makes Science scientific? -- 4 Absolute Justification -- 4.1 Basic Concepts of Cognition -- 4.2 Strategies to derive scientific statements -- 4.2.1 Introduction -- 4.2.2 Inductivism -- 4.2.3 Pragmatism - Foundation by Method -- 4.2.4 Falsificationism -- 4.2.5 Conclusion -- 5 Beyond Absolute Justification -- 5.1 Against Scepticism -- 5.2 Dogmatism -- 5.3 Common Sense -- 5.4 An Axiomatic Approach -- 6 The First Principle: Its Cognitive Status -- 6.1 Consequences of Relativism -- 6.2 Overcoming Relativism -- 7 Methodological Implications -- III THE METHOD OF ECONOMICS AND CONTRACT THEORY -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Overview -- 3 Instrumentalism vs. Realism -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Natural vs. Social Sciences -- 4 Methodological Individualism -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Rational Choice -- 4.2.1 Choice under Certainty -- 4.2.2 Choice under Uncertainty -- 4.3 A Remark on Game Theory -- 4.4 Defending Rational Choice on Normative Grounds -- 4.5 Economics as a Formal vs. Real Science -- 4.6 Realism of Assumptions -- 4.7 Defending Homo Oeconomicus -- 4.7.1 Introduction -- 4.7.2 Relevant Situations -- 4.7.3 Scope of Concepts -- 4.7.4 Robustness - Worst Case -- 4.7.5 Instrumentalism in Modeling -- 4.8 Bounded Rationality vs. Unconscious Rationality -- 4.8.1 Introduction -- 4.8.2 The Evolutionary Mechanism -- 4.8.3 Method of Evolutionary Economics -- 4.9 Piecemeal Social Engineering -- 4.10 Objection of Historicism -- 5< -- tab/> -- Introspection in Economics -- 5.1 Internal dimension and Instability -- 5.2 Blackboxing vs. Qualitative Method. 327 $a5.3 Heuristic or Independent Source? -- 5.4 The Hermeneutical Method and a priorism -- 6 Empirical Methods -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Reviving Monism -- 6.2.1 Theory of Revealed Preferences -- 6.2.2 Panphysicalism -- 6.3 Interviews -- 6.4 Controlled Experiment -- 6.5 Econometrics - Historical Experiment -- 6.6 Informal evidence -- 6.7 The Problem of Aggregation -- 6.8 Macro modeling: Beyond Methodological Individualism -- 6.9 Verificationism vs. Falsifications: A Normative Evaluation -- 7 Applied Microeconomics -- 7.1 Applied Microeconomics as an Art -- 7.2 Convergence of Applied Microeconomics and BWL -- 8 Model of Optimal Contract Design -- 8.1 Economics of Institutions -- 8.2 Solving for the Optimal Contract -- 8.3 The Rationale for the Micro-foundation -- 8.4 A Structured Approach -- 9 Practical Life and Theory -- IV ANALYTICAL AGENCY MODELS -- 1 Overview -- 2 The Classical Risk-Incentive Trade-Off -- 2.1 The Basic Model -- 2.1.1 Introduction -- 2.1.2 Modeling Assumptions -- 2.1.3 Contractible Effort -- 2.1.4 Uncontractible Effort -- 2.1.5 Discussion -- 2.2 Risk-Incentive Trade-off for Linear Contracts -- 2.2.1 Introduction -- 2.2.2 Modeling Assumptions -- 2.2.3 The Model -- 2.2.4 Discussion -- 2.2.5 Appendix -- 2.3 Risk Sharing -- 2.3.1 Introduction -- 2.3.2 The Model -- 2.3.3 Model Extension: Diversification -- 2.3.4 Discussion -- 2.4 The Optimal Contract -- 2.4.1 Introduction -- 2.4.2 Mechanics of the Optimal Sharing Rule -- 2.4.3 The Case for Linear Contracts -- 2.4.4 Valuable Information -- 2.4.5 Discussion -- 2.5 Limitations and Extensions -- 3 Error in judgement, Bankruptcy -- 3.1 Input Monitoring -- 3.1.1 Introduction -- 3.1.2 Modeling Assumptions -- 3.1.3 Absence of both Error and Bankruptcy Constraint -- 3.1.4 Bankruptcy constraint -- 3.1.5 Extension: The role of Agent Risk Averseness -- 3.1.6 Presence of Error -- 3.1.7 Discussion. 327 $a3.2 Output Monitoring -- 3.2.1 Introduction -- 3.2.2 Shifting Support -- 3.2.3 Moral Hazard with respect to Risk -- 3.2.4 Discussion -- 4 Transaction Cost, Bonding, Distortion -- 4.1 Transaction Cost and Bonding -- 4.2 Distortion -- 4.2.1 Introduction -- 4.2.2 The Model -- 4.2.3 Discussion -- 5 Dynamic Extensions -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Income smoothing -- 5.2.1 Introduction -- 5.2.2 The Model -- 5.2.3 Discussion -- 5.3 Reputation Effects in Supergames -- 5.3.1 Introduction -- 5.3.2 Observable but Uncontractible Effort -- 5.3.3 Observable but Uncontractible Output -- 5.3.4 Reinterpretation of the Discount rate -- 5.3.5 A Multiparty Extension -- 5.3.6 Discussion -- 5.4 Career Concerns - Learning -- 5.4.1 Introduction -- 5.4.2 The Basic Model -- 5.4.3 Extension: Adding Innovation -- 5.4.4 Disequilibrium - Transient Effects -- 5.4.5 Discussion -- V CONCLUSIONS -- 1.1 Results -- 1.2 Checklist -- 1.3 Outlook. 330 $aDesigning a contract is often more of an economic than a legal problem. A good contract protects parties against opportunistic behavior while providing motivation to cooperate. This is where economics and, especially contract theory, may prove helpful by enhancing our understanding of incentive issues. The purpose of this book is to provide specific tools which will help to write better contracts in real world environments. Concentrating on moral hazard literature, this book derives a tentative checklist for drafting contracts. As an economic contribution to a field traditionally considered an art rather than a science, this treatment also gives much attention to methodological issues. 410 0$aForschungsergebnisse der Wirtschaftsuniversita?t Wien ;$vBand 3. 606 $aAgency (Law) 606 $aContracts$xMethodology 610 $aAgency 610 $aAgency-Theorie 610 $aAnalysis 610 $aApproach 610 $aasymmetrische Information 610 $aContracts 610 $aJoint Ventures 610 $aKontrakttheorie 610 $aMethodology 610 $aNetzwerk 610 $aOutsourcing 610 $aprivate Information 610 $aStremitzer 610 $aStructured 610 $aTheory 610 $aTransaktionsbeziehung 610 $aVertrag 610 $aWriting 615 0$aAgency (Law) 615 0$aContracts$xMethodology. 676 $a346.0201 700 $aStremitzer$b Alexander$0944910 801 2$bUkMaJRU 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910297054203321 996 $aAgency theory$92133261 997 $aUNINA LEADER 02847nam 22004575 450 001 9910255219003321 005 20200629212221.0 010 $a1-137-58758-X 024 7 $a10.1057/978-1-137-58758-9 035 $a(CKB)4100000000882782 035 $a(DE-He213)978-1-137-58758-9 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5115303 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000000882782 100 $a20171027d2017 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurnn|008mamaa 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aMartin Luther's Legacy $eReforming Reformation Theology for the 21st Century /$fby Mark Ellingsen 205 $a1st ed. 2017. 210 1$aNew York :$cPalgrave Macmillan US :$cImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,$d2017. 215 $a1 online resource (XXVIII, 348 p.) 300 $aIncludes index. 311 $a1-137-58757-1 327 $a1. Introduction: Luther The Reformer, Past and Present -- 2. Scripture and Theological Method -- 3. God and Trinity -- 4. Christology -- 5. The Holy Spirit -- 6. Creation and Providence -- 7. Human Nature, Sin, and Free Will -- 8. Atonement -- 9. Justification -- 10. The Christian Life (Sanctification) -- 11. Church -- 12. Ministry -- 13. Sacraments -- 14. Eschatology -- 15. Social Ethics -- 16. Conclusion: How Luther Still Reforms Us. 330 $aThis volume is a unique interpretation of what Martin Luther contributes to renewed appreciation of Biblical diversity. The Church in the West is struggling. One reason behind this is that the prevailing models for Theology have imposed logical and modern ways of thinking about faith that renders theology academic, and therefore largely irrelevant for daily life. By letting the first Reformer speak for himself in this book, Mark Ellingsen shows how Martin Luther?s theological approach can reform the Church?s theology today. The real Luther--not the one taught by his various systematic interpreters--presents Christian faith in its entirety, with all its rough edges, in such a way as to direct on how and when to employ those dimensions of the Biblical witness most appropriate for the situation in which we find ourselves. . 606 $aReligion?History 606 $aProtestantism 606 $aHistory of Religion$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/1A7000 606 $aProtestantism and Lutheranism$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/1A3080 615 0$aReligion?History. 615 0$aProtestantism. 615 14$aHistory of Religion. 615 24$aProtestantism and Lutheranism. 676 $a200.09 700 $aEllingsen$b Mark$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0990521 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910255219003321 996 $aMartin Luther's Legacy$92266012 997 $aUNINA