LEADER 05204nam 2200685 a 450 001 9910220157703321 005 20230725051408.0 010 $a1-283-59733-0 010 $a9786613909787 010 $a0-8330-5317-5 035 $a(CKB)2550000000049463 035 $a(EBL)777017 035 $a(OCoLC)755415866 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000801684 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11430537 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000801684 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10794420 035 $a(PQKB)11256478 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL777017 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10500657 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC777017 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000049463 100 $a20111014d2011 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 00$aInsights from selected case studies$b[electronic resource] /$fAngel Rabasa ... [et al.] 210 $aSanta Monica, Calif. $cRAND Corporation$d2011 215 $a1 online resource (321 p.) 225 0 $aFrom insurgency to stability ;$vv. 2 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-8330-5314-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aCover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures and Maps; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Chapter One: Introduction; Background; The Transition from Counterinsurgency to Stability; The Case Studies; Chapter Two: The Philippines; Introduction: Background of the Communist Conflict in the Philippines; Counterinsurgency Under Marcos; The Post-Marcos Period; Strategy; CPP/NPA; The Philippine State; Self-Defense Militias; AFP COIN Progress; Transition?; Conclusion: Lessons for the United States; Chapter Three: Counterinsurgency Transition Case Study: Colombia 327 $aNature and Scope of the ConflictInternational and Transnational Actors; Strategy (Pre-Transition); Colombian Government Strategy; Insurgent Strategy; External Powers Supporting Belligerents; Key Strengths and Weaknesses of the Strategies; How the Parties Define "Victory"; The Transition Period; Managing the Transition; Institutional Framework: Theory and Practice; Stages of Transition; Implementation: What Is the Actual Experience of the ColombianTransition?; Gaps; Conclusions; Assessment of Colombian Transition Plan; Prospects for the Future 327 $aWhat Capabilities Does the United States Need to Have or Need toDevelop?Chapter Four: Counterinsurgency Transition Case Study: El Salvador; Introduction; Strategy (Pre-Transition); The Transition Period; Domestic Factors; The United States' Role; The Role of the International Community; Managing the Transition; Ceasefire and Demobilization; Public Security and Security-Sector Reform; ESAF Reform; Police Reform; Human Rights, Truth and Reconciliation; Addressing the Factors Contributing to the Insurgency; Conclusions; A Successful Transition?; Lessons Learned 327 $aChapter Five: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, 2006-2009Introduction; Background: Mali's North-South Divide; A History of Contestation; Phase 1: The ADC Rebellion, May-July 2006; Introduction: Brief History of the Conflict Leading Up to thePeriod of Transition; Strategy (Pre-Transition); The Transition Period; Managing the Transition; Phase 2: The ATNM Rebellion (May 2007-February 2009); Introduction: Brief History of the Conflict Leading Up to thePeriod of Transition; Strategy (Pre-Transition); The Transition Period; Managing the Transition; Conclusions 327 $aChapter Six: The Transition in Al-Anbar, IraqIntroduction; A Brief History of the Conflict in Al-Anbar Province; Pre-Transition Strategy, 2005-2006; Insurgent Strategies in the Pre-Transition Period; External Powers Supporting the Anbar Insurgents; Counterinsurgency and Transition, 2006-2008; The Transition in Anbar: Contributing Factors; False Starts and Missed Opportunities on the Road to Transition; External Actors' Understanding of the Changing ConflictDynamics; Setting the Stage for and Managing the Transition; Transition Process Components; Signs the Coalition Forces Were "Winning" 327 $aThe Transition Outcome in Al-Anbar 330 $aThis book examines six case studies of insurgencies from around the world to determine the key factors necessary for a successful transition from counterinsurgency to a more stable situation. The authors review the causes of each insurgency and the key players involved, and examine what the government did right--or wrong--to bring the insurgency to an end and to transition to greater stability. 606 $aCounterinsurgency 606 $aCounterinsurgency$vCase studies 606 $aPeace-building$vCase studies 607 $aUnited States$xArmed Forces$xStability operations$vCase studies 615 0$aCounterinsurgency. 615 0$aCounterinsurgency 615 0$aPeace-building 676 $a327.73 676 $a355.4 676 $a355.425 701 $aRabasa$b Angel$0674557 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910220157703321 996 $aInsights from selected case studies$92199362 997 $aUNINA