LEADER 03881nam 2200685Ia 450 001 9910220137503321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-282-28301-4 010 $a9786612283017 010 $a0-8330-3234-8 035 $a(CKB)111056486806456 035 $a(EBL)227840 035 $a(OCoLC)475935239 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000215359 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11216853 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000215359 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10184190 035 $a(PQKB)10042563 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL227840 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10505578 035 $a(OCoLC)50869638 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC227840 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111056486806456 100 $a20010614d2001 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aOperations against enemy leaders /$fStephen T. Hosmer 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aSanta Monica, CA $cRand$d2001 215 $a1 online resource (178 p.) 300 $a"Prepared for the United States Air Force." 300 $a"Project Air Force." 311 $a0-8330-3028-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 137-151). 327 $aPREFACE; TABLE; SUMMARY; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; ABBREVIATIONS; Chapter One INTRODUCTION; OBJECTIVES OF LEADERSHIP ATTACKS; STUDY APPROACH; SOURCES; ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT; Chapter Two ATTACKING LEADERS DIRECTLY; ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING DIRECT ATTACKS; CONSTRAINTS ON LEADERSHIP ATTACKS; SITUATIONS IN WHICH DIRECT ATTACKS ARE LIKELY TO BE SANCTIONED; ASSESSING THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF DIRECT ATTACKS; DIRECT ATTACKS RARELY PRODUCE WANTED POLICY CHANGES; DIRECT ATTACKS OFTEN FAIL TO DETER UNWANTED ENEMY BEHAVIOR; DIRECT ATTACKS CAN SOMETIMES PRODUCE HARMFUL UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 327 $aDIRECT ATTACKS FREQUENTLY FAIL TO NEUTRALIZE THEIR INTENDED TARGETSPREREQUISITES OF EFFECTIVE AIR ATTACKS ON ENEMY LEADERS; Chapter Three FACILITATING COUPS OR REBELLIONS; ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING SUPPORT TO COUPS OR REBELLIONS; A POOR SUCCESS RATE WITH COUPS AND REBELLIONS; SUPPORT OF REBELLION TO CHANGE HOSTILE POLICY; WHY U.S. ADVERSARIES HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO OVERTHROW AND INTIMIDATE; COERCIVE AND DETERRENT EFFECTS OF DIRECT ATTACKS, COUPS, AND REBELLIONS; PREREQUISITES OF EFFECTIVE AIR SUPPORT TO COUPS AND REBELLIONS; Chapter Four TAKING DOWN REGIMES WITH EXTERNAL MILITARY FORCE 327 $aRATIONALE FOR MAINTAINING CAPABILITIES TO TAKE DOWN ENEMY REGIMESPOTENTIAL CONSTRAINTS ON CONDUCTING TAKEDOWNS; PREREQUISITES OF EFFECTIVE AIR SUPPORT TO EXTERNAL OVERTHROW; ENHANCING THE THREAT OF EXTERNAL OVERTHROW; Chapter Five CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS; REMOVING ENEMY LEADERS WILL BE NEITHER EASY NOR ALWAYS BENEFICIAL; WHEN LEADERSHIP ATTACKS ARE MOST LIKELY TO BE SANCTIONED; PREREQUISITES OF THE EFFECTIVE USE OF AIR POWER IN DIRECT ATTACKS, COUPS, REBELLIONS, AND TAKEDOWNS; THE DETERRENT AND COERCIVE EFFECTS OF THREATS TO REMOVE LEADERS; BIBLIOGRAPHY 330 $aAn examination of a number of leadership attacks from World War II to the 21st century. It offers insights into the comparative efficacy of various forms of leadership attacks, their potential coercive and deterrent value, and the possible unintended consequences of their ill-considered use. 606 $aInsurgency 606 $aCoups d'e?tat 606 $aAssassination 607 $aUnited States$xMilitary policy 615 0$aInsurgency. 615 0$aCoups d'e?tat. 615 0$aAssassination. 676 $a327.1273 700 $aHosmer$b Stephen T$0910140 712 02$aUnited States.$bAir Force. 712 02$aRand Corporation. 712 02$aProject Air Force (U.S.) 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910220137503321 996 $aOperations against enemy leaders$92047536 997 $aUNINA