LEADER 04496nam 2200601Ia 450 001 9910220135503321 005 20230617012645.0 010 $a1-283-59730-6 010 $a9786613909756 010 $a0-8330-3622-X 035 $a(CKB)111090529191306 035 $a(EBL)197464 035 $a(OCoLC)367880235 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000333642 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11248473 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000333642 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10356262 035 $a(PQKB)10842653 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL197464 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10056152 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC197464 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111090529191306 100 $a20031230d2004 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 00$aMapping the risks$b[electronic resource] $eassessing homeland security implications of publicly available geospatial information /$fJohn C. Baker ... [et al] 210 $aSanta Monica, CA $cRand Corporation$d2004 215 $a1 online resource (236 p.) 300 $a"MG-142." 311 $a0-8330-3547-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aCover; Preface; Sponsor Guidance; The RAND Corporation Quality Assurance Process; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE Introduction; Assessing the Homeland Security Implication of Geospatial Information; Public Access to Geospatial Information; Research Objectives; Research Methodology; Need for an Analytical Framework; How the Report Is Organized; CHAPTER TWO What Are the Attackers' Key Information Needs?; Methodology; Defining the Threat Space; The Attacker: Motivations, Strategies, and Modalities of Attack 327 $aThe Attacker's Tool Box: Types of Weapons Considered A General Model of Attacker Information Needs; Attackers Have Substantial Flexibility in Fulfilling Their Information Needs; Summary; CHAPTER THREE What Publicly Available Geospatial Information Is Significant to Potential Attackers' Needs?; Federal Geospatial Information in the Public Domain; Structured Survey Used to Identify Federal Geospatial Data Sources; Availability of Nonfederal Geospatial Information; Assessing Whether Sources Contain Potentially Critical Site Information; Assessing the Potential Significance of This Information 327 $aCase Studies Comparing Federal and Nonfederal Sources of Geospatial Information Other Observations About Publicly Accessible Federal Geospatial Information; Summary; CHAPTER FOUR An Analytical Framework for Assessing the Homeland Security Implications of Publicly Accessible Geospatial Information; Framework for Analysis: An Overview; Framework for Analysis: Three Analytical Filters; Illustrating the Framework; Considerations in Restricting Public Access to Sensitive Data; Long-Term Need for a More Comprehensive Model; Summary; CHAPTER FIVE Key Findings and Recommendations; Key Findings 327 $aBroader Implications General Recommendations; Agency-Specific Recommendations; APPENDIX A Federal Agencies Examined; APPENDIX B Federal Geospatial Data Sources Identified; APPENDIX C Detailed Examples of Geospatial Information Analyses; APPENDIX D Overview of Critical U.S. Sites: Critical Infrastructure and Other Key Homeland Locations; Bibliography 330 $aFollowing the attacks of September 11, 2001, many agencies within the federal government began restricting some of their publicly available geospatial data and information from such sources as the World Wide Web. As time passes, however, decisionmakers have begun to ask whether and how such information specifically helps potential attackers, including terrorists, to select U.S. homeland sites and prepare for better attacks. The research detailed in this book aims to assist decisionmakers tasked with the responsibility of choosing which geospatial information to make available and which to rest 606 $aCivil defense$zUnited States 606 $aGeographic information systems$xDefense measures$zUnited States 615 0$aCivil defense 615 0$aGeographic information systems$xDefense measures 676 $a363.34/7/0285 701 $aBaker$b John C.$f1949-$0924038 712 02$aUnited States.$bNational Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910220135503321 996 $aMapping the risks$92073722 997 $aUNINA