LEADER 03761nam 2200661 a 450 001 9910220125303321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-282-79724-7 010 $a9786612797248 010 $a0-8330-4983-6 035 $a(CKB)2670000000033349 035 $a(EBL)557170 035 $a(OCoLC)654029538 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000419930 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11278360 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000419930 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10385591 035 $a(PQKB)10888977 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL557170 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10404205 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4969956 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL279724 035 $a(OCoLC)655854572 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC557170 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4969956 035 $a(oapen)doab114873 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000033349 100 $a20100412d2010 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aHow insurgencies end /$fBen Connable and Martin C. Libicki 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aSanta Monica, CA $cRAND$dc2010 215 $a1 online resource (268 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 08$a0-8330-4952-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 223-244). 327 $aCover; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE - Introduction; Purpose of This Monograph; A Note on Contemporary Threats and Operations; Research Approach; Graphs Used in This Monograph; Conventional Wisdom; How This Monograph Is Organized; CHAPTER TWO - Classifying Outcomes and Selecting Cases; Outcomes; Type I: Government Loss; Type II: Government Victory; Type III: Mixed (Stalemate/Negotiated Settlement); Type IV: Inconclusive or Ongoing Outcome; The Tipping Point: Explanation by Way of Example; Key Indicators: A Note of Caution 327 $aCHAPTER THREE - Assessments of Insurgency Endings: Time and External FactorsAssessments of Time and External Factors; Duration of Conflict; Sanctuary Available; Outside Intervention in Support of Government; Outside Intervention in Support of Insurgencies; CHAPTER FOUR - Assessments of Insurgency Endings: Internal Factors; Structure; Thailand and the BRN and the P ULO; Urbanization; Uruguay and the Tupamaros; Insurgent Use of Terrorism; Insurgent Strength; System of Government; CHAPTER FIVE - Assessments of Insurgency Endings: Other Factors; Force Ratios; Civil-Defense Forces 327 $aCHAPTER SIX - ConclusionsAPPENDIX A - Case Studies: Methodology; APPENDIX B - Supplemental Findings; APPENDIX C - Multivariate Regression Analysis; APPENDIX D - Insurgencies Not Examined for This Publication; APPENDIX E - Categories Used for the Spring 2006 Survey; APPENDIX F - Unavoidable Ambiguities; APPENDIX G - Questions Used for the Autumn 2006 Survey; Glossary; Bibliography 330 $aRAND studied 89 modern insurgency cases to test conventional understanding about how insurgencies end. Findings relevant to policymakers and analysts include that modern insurgencies last about ten years; withdrawal of state support cripples insurgencies; civil defense forces are useful for both sides; pseudodemocracies fare poorly against insurgents; and governments win more often in the long run. 606 $aInsurgency$vCase studies 606 $aCounterinsurgency$vCase studies 615 0$aInsurgency 615 0$aCounterinsurgency 676 $a355.02/18 700 $aConnable$b Ben$0924041 701 $aLibicki$b Martin C$0877014 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910220125303321 996 $aHow insurgencies end$92475929 997 $aUNINA