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100   $a20160829d2014      uh             0
101 0 $aeng
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aManagement perspectives pertaining to root cause analyses of Nunn-McCurdy breaches. Volume 6$e: Contractor motivations and anticipating breaches /$fMark V. Arena [et al.]
210 31$aSanta Monica, CA :$cRand Corporation ;$d2014
215   $a1 online resource (xxvi, 108 pages) $ccolor illustrations
300   $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
300   $a"Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense."
300   $a"This research was sponsored by OSD PARCA and conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Preface
311 1 $a0-8330-8739-8 
327   $aIntroduction -- Contractor incentives -- A methodology for anticipating Nunn-McCurdy breaches -- Concluding observations.
330   $aWith an eye to making defense acquisition more effective and efficient, the authors explore defense contractor motivations in pursuing defense contracts and identify mechanisms that might more closely align those incentives with Department of Defense goals. They enumerate several motivations that drive contractors, most of which center on the financial aspects of running an enterprise. Then, they turn to the other side of the negotiating table and identify areas of influence or levers that the government can use to align the contracting process more closely with contractor motivations. They also analyze major defense acquisition programs to determine if it is possible to identify programs that might incur a future Nunn-McCurdy breach by reviewing a number of acquisition programs that have incurred breaches in the past and analyzing them for common characteristics. Their analytic framework enables oversight officials to identify programs with a greater risk of incurring a critical cost breach, which enables officials to focus more intently on a smaller set of programs and which provides hypotheses about what to look for in these programs.
606   $aPublic contracts$xAuditing$zUnited States
606   $aGovernment contractors$zUnited States
607   $aUnited States$xArmed Forces$xWeapons systems$xCosts
607   $aUnited States$xArmed Forces$xEquipment$xCosts
615  0$aPublic contracts$xAuditing
615  0$aGovernment contractors
676   $a355.62120973
700   $aArena$b Mark V$01242192
712 02$aNational Defense Research Institute (U.S.)
712 02$aRand Corporation
801  0$bPQKB
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910220115703321
996   $aManagement perspectives pertaining to root cause analyses of Nunn-McCurdy breaches. Volume 6$92907504
997   $aUNINA