LEADER 02326oam  2200517z- 450 
001 9910220086203321
005 20231005
010   $a0-8330-9316-9
035   $a(CKB)3710000000595176
035   $a(oapen)doab115532
035   $a(EXLCZ)993710000000595176
100   $a20210414c2015uuuu  -u-         -
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurmn|---annan
181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 00$aA Surprise Out of Zion?$eCase Studies in Israel's Decisions on Whether to Alert the United States to Preemptive and Preventive Strikes, from Suez to the Syrian Nuclear Reactor
210   $cRAND Corporation$d2015
215   $a1 online resource
311 08$a0-8330-8416-X 
327   $aIntroduction -- Case I: The Suez War, 1956 -- Case II: The Six-Day War, 1967 -- Case III: The Raid on Osiraq, 1981 -- Case IV: The Raid on al-Kibar, 2007 -- Conclusion.
330   $aMight U.S. officials be surprised by an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities? This study examines key historical precedents, considering four cases in which Israeli leaders chose preemptive or preventive military strikes and had to decide whether to notify or consult with the United States: the Suez crisis of 1956, the Six-Day War of 1967, the 1981 strike on Iraq's nuclear reactor, and the 2007 bombing of Syria's al-Kibar nuclear facility.
517   $aSurprise Out of Zion?
517   $aA Surprise Out of Zion?
606   $aArms negotiation and control$2bicssc
606   $aMiddle Eastern history$2bicssc
606   $aMilitary history$2bicssc
607   $aIsrael$xForeign relations$zUnited States$vCase studies
607   $aUnited States$xForeign relations$zIsrael$vCase studies
607   $aIsrael$xHistory, Military$y20th century
607   $aIsrael$2fast
607   $aUnited States$2fast
608   $aCase studies.$2fast
608   $aMilitary history.$2fast
610   $aHistory
610   $aPolitical Science
615  7$aArms negotiation and control
615  7$aMiddle Eastern history
615  7$aMilitary history
700   $aBass$b Warren$01121530
712 02$aRand Corporation.$bNational Security Research Division,
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910220086203321
996   $aA surprise out of Zion$92894531
997   $aUNINA