LEADER 04540nam 2200625 a 450 001 9910220079403321 005 20240617065607.0 010 $a1-282-94053-8 010 $a9786612940538 010 $a0-8330-5078-8 035 $a(CKB)2670000000048055 035 $a(EBL)618720 035 $a(OCoLC)649427239 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000443966 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12193422 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000443966 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10461740 035 $a(PQKB)10175015 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL618720 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10425065 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC618720 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000048055 100 $a20100616d2010 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aVictory has a thousand fathers $esources of success in counterinsurgency /$fChristopher Paul, Colin P. Clark, Beth Grill 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aSanta Monica, Calif. $cRAND National Defence Research Institute$d2010 215 $a1 online resource (187 p.) 300 $a"Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defence." 311 $a0-8330-4961-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aCover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE - Introduction; Purpose of This Study; Data and Analyses; About This Monograph and the Accompanying Case Studies; CHAPTER TWO - The Cases; Case Selection and Data Collection; Phased Data; Assessing Case Outcomes; Nicaragua (Somoza), 1978-1979; Afghanistan (Anti-Soviet), 1978-1992; Kampuchea, 1978-1992; El Salvador, 1979-1992; Somalia, 1980-1991; Peru, 1980-1992; Nicaragua (Contras), 1981-1990; Senegal, 1982-2002; Turkey (PKK), 1984-1999; Sudan (SPLA), 1984-2004 327 $aUganda (ADF), 1986-2000 Papua New Guinea, 1988-1998; Liberia, 1989-1997; Rwanda, 1990-1994; Moldova, 1990-1992; Sierra Leone, 1991-2002; Algeria (GIA), 1992-2004; Croatia, 1992-1995; Afghanistan (Post-Soviet), 1992-1996; Tajikistan, 1992-1997; Georgia/Abkhazia, 1992-1994; Nagorno-Karabakh, 1992-1994; Bosnia, 1992-1995; Burundi, 1993-2003; Chechnya I, 1994-1996; Afghanistan (Taliban), 1996-2001; Zaire (Anti-Mobutu), 1996-1997; Kosovo, 1996-1999; Nepal, 1997-2006; Democratic Republic of the Congo (Anti-Kabila), 1998-2003; Case Narrative Results 327 $aCHAPTER THREE - Testing the Approaches to Counterinsurgency Representing the Approaches in the Data; Analysis of the Relationships Between Case Factors and Case Outcomes; Factor Stacks; Tests of Each Approach; Classic COIN Approaches; Contemporary Approaches to COIN; Insurgent Approaches; Summary of the Tests of the Approaches; CHAPTER FOUR - Broader Findings; Scorecard: Balance of Good Versus Bad Practices; Every Insurgency May Be Unique, but Not at This Level of Analysis; Which Successful Approach Is Most Essential? Qualitative Comparative Analysis; Phase Outcomes 327 $aCHAPTER FIVE - Conclusions and Recommendations Key Findings; Effective COIN Practices Tend to Run in Packs; The Balance of Good Versus Bad Practices Perfectly Predicts Outcomes; Poor Beginnings Do Not Necessarily Lead to Poor Ends; Repression Wins Phases, but Usually Not Cases; Tangible Support Trumps Popular Support; APPENDIXES; A. Methods and Data; B. Details of Qualitative Comparative Analysis; C. Possible Criticisms of the Analyses and Response Commentary; References 327 $aSUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL - Matrix of Factors Representing 20 Approaches to COIN and Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors Back Cover 330 $aInsurgency is the most prevalent form of armed conflict and the subject of countless studies, yet the U.S. military has only recently begun to review doctrine and training in this area. An examination of approaches to counterinsurgency from 30 recent resolved campaigns reveals, for example, that good COIN practices tend to ""run in packs"" and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict. 606 $aCounterinsurgency$vCase studies 615 0$aCounterinsurgency 676 $a355.02/18 676 $a355.0218 700 $aPaul$b Christopher$0905756 701 $aClark$b Colin P$0924025 701 $aGrill$b Beth$0905757 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910220079403321 996 $aVictory has a thousand fathers$92073710 997 $aUNINA