LEADER 05492nam 2200733Ia 450 001 9910219991503321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a9786612451096 010 $a9781282451094 010 $a128245109X 010 $a9780833048288 010 $a0833048287 010 $a9780585245485 010 $a0585245487 035 $a(CKB)111004368714946 035 $a(EBL)475036 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000100691 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11124604 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000100691 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10037288 035 $a(PQKB)11276871 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC475036 035 $a(oapen)doab114827 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111004368714946 100 $a19990407d1999 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aAir power as a coercive instrument /$fDaniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, Eric Larson 210 $aSanta Monica, CA $cRand$d1999 215 $a1 online resource (193 p.) 300 $a"MR-1061-AF." 300 $a"Project Air Force, Rand". 311 08$a9780833027436 311 08$a0833027433 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aCover; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgements; Chapter One - Introduction; Coercion and U.S. National Security Policy; The Role of the USAF; Methodology and Cases Examined; Organization; Part 1. Definitions and Theory; Chapter Two - How to Think About Coercion; Definitions; A Theoretical Starting Point; Thinking about Coercion: a Policymaker's Perspective; Problem One: Limited Relevance; Problem Two: Measurement Pathologies; The Uncertain Meaning of "Success"; Conclusions; Part 2. Successful Coercive Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past 327 $aChapter Three - Explaining Success or Failure: the Historical Record Conditions for Successful Coercion; Escalation Dominance; Threatening to Defeat an Adversary's Strategy; Coercion in Context: Magnifying Third-Party Threats; Common Challenges in Coercive Operations; Intelligence and Estimation Challenges; Misperceptions and Coercion; Credibility Challenges; Feasibility Challenges; Conclusions; Part 3. Coercive Diplomacy Today; Chapter Four - Domestic Constraints on Coercion; Domestic Politics and the Success of Coercive Diplomacy; Constraints and the Democratic System 327 $aThe Challenge of Obtaining Domestic Support Consequences of Low Support; Sources of Domestic Constraints; Declaratory Policy; Congressional Checks and Balances, and Other Restrictions; The Press; Some Correlates of Public Support; Some Conditions Under Which Support Is Typically High; How an Adversary can Exploit U.S. Domestic Politics; Diminishing the Interests; Tarnishing the Cause and Conduct of the Operation; Dragging Out a Conflict; Imposing Costs; Manipulating Asymmetries in Escalation Preferences; Conclusions; Chapter Five - Coercion and Coalitions 327 $aThe Advantages of Coalitions for Coercers Limits Imposed by Coalitions; Lack of a Common Agenda; Shared Control; Limits to Escalation; Reduced Credibility; Coalitions and Adversary Counter-Coercion; Conclusions; Chapter Six - Coercing Nonstate Actors: a Challenge for the Future; Types of Missions; Coercing Local Warlords; Coercing State Sponsors; Characteristics of Coercive Operations Against Nonstate Actors; Nonstate Adversaries May Lack Identifiable and Targetable Assets; Inaccurate Intelligence Estimates Are Particularly Common; Nonstate Adversaries May Lack Control over Constituent Elements 327 $aIndirect Coercion Is Often Difficult, Unreliable, and Counterproductive Nonstate Actors Are Adept at Exploiting Countermeasures to Coercion; Conclusions; Part 4. Coercion and the U.S. Air Force; Chapter Seven - Implications and Recommendations for the USAF; Air Power and Escalation Dominance; Air Power and Adversary Military Operations; Air Power and the Magnification of Third-Party Threats; Air Power and Common Challenges in Coercive Operations; The Need for Restraint; Appendix A - Cases Examined for this Study; Appendix B - Cases and Conditions for Success 327 $aAppendix C - Coercive Attempts and Common Challenges 330 $aCoercion--the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior--is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the lik 606 $aAir power$zUnited States 606 $aAir power 606 $aMilitary planning$zUnited States 615 0$aAir power 615 0$aAir power. 615 0$aMilitary planning 676 $a358.4/14/0973 700 $aByman$b Daniel$f1967-$0720316 701 $aLarson$b Eric V$g(Eric Victor),$f1957-$0879922 701 $aWaxman$b Matthew C.$f1972-$01152405 712 02$aProject Air Force (U.S.) 712 02$aRand Corporation. 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910219991503321 996 $aAir power as a coercive instrument$92864592 997 $aUNINA