LEADER 03954nam 2200625 a 450 001 9910219991403321 005 20240410072745.0 010 $a0-8330-3238-0 035 $a(CKB)111056486374742 035 $a(OCoLC)50763967 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10505602 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000128627 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11991871 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000128627 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10069059 035 $a(PQKB)10827901 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL227864 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10505602 035 $a(OCoLC)123109585 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC227864 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111056486374742 100 $a20010514h20012001 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe conflict over Kosovo $ewhy Milosevic decided to settle when he did /$fStephen T. Hosmer 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aSanta Monica, Calif. :$cRand,$d2001. 210 4$aŠ2001 215 $a1 online resource (xxxi, 155 pages) $cillustrations, charts 225 1 $aProject Air Force series on Operation Allied Force 300 $a"Prepared for the United States Air Force. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited." 311 0 $a0-8330-3003-5 311 0 $a0-585-42538-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 139-155). 327 $aIntroduction He assumed accepting Rambouillet terms would endanger his rule He assumed he could force NATO to offer better terms He realized that his hoped-for leverage on NATO had evaporated Bombing produced a popular climate conducive to concessions Damage to "dual-use" infrastructure generated growing pressure Damage to military forces and KLA "resurgence" generated little pressure He expected unconstrained bombing if NATO's terms were rejected He probably also worried about threat of future invasion He believed NATO's terms provided him with some political cover Concluding observations 330 $aThis report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations 410 0$aProject Air Force series on Operation Allied Force. 517 3 $aWhy Milosevic decided to settle when he did 606 $aKosovo War, 1998-1999 606 $aKosovo War, 1998-1999 615 0$aKosovo War, 1998-1999. 615 0$aKosovo War, 1998-1999. 676 $a949.7103 700 $aHosmer$b Stephen T$0910140 712 02$aUnited States.$bAir Force. 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910219991403321 996 $aThe conflict over Kosovo$92037070 997 $aUNINA