LEADER 04300nam 2200757Ia 450 001 9910169194203321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-8014-6125-1 010 $a0-8014-5676-2 010 $a0-8014-6077-8 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801460777 035 $a(CKB)2550000000037240 035 $a(OCoLC)742515532 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10478344 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000540475 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11361135 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000540475 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10598685 035 $a(PQKB)11496395 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001496010 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse28818 035 $a(DE-B1597)478350 035 $a(OCoLC)979630437 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801460777 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138224 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10478344 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL681623 035 $a(ScCtBLL)0a0179e1-da55-45dc-941a-709b1ffb9c4e 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138224 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000037240 100 $a20101123d2011 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe pseudo-democrat's dilemma $ewhy election observation became an international norm /$fSusan D. Hyde 210 $aIthaca $cCornell University Press$d2011 210 1$aIthaca, NY : $cCornell University Press, $d[2011] 210 4$dİ2015 215 $a1 online resource (261 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a1-322-50341-9 311 $a0-8014-4966-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aSignaling democracy and the norm of internationally observed elections -- Sovereign leaders and the decision to invite observers -- Democracy-contingent benefits -- Does election monitoring matter? -- The quality of monitoring and strategic manipulation -- Conclusion : constrained leaders and changing international expectations. 330 $aWhy did election monitoring become an international norm? Why do pseudo-democrats-undemocratic leaders who present themselves as democratic-invite international observers, even when they are likely to be caught manipulating elections? Is election observation an effective tool of democracy promotion, or is it simply a way to legitimize electoral autocracies? In The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma, Susan D. Hyde explains international election monitoring with a new theory of international norm formation. Hyde argues that election observation was initiated by states seeking international support. International benefits tied to democracy give some governments an incentive to signal their commitment to democratization without having to give up power. Invitations to nonpartisan foreigners to monitor elections, and avoiding their criticism, became a widely recognized and imitated signal of a government's purported commitment to democratic elections.Hyde draws on cross-national data on the global spread of election observation between 1960 and 2006, detailed descriptions of the characteristics of countries that do and do not invite observers, and evidence of three ways that election monitoring is costly to pseudo-democrats: micro-level experimental tests from elections in Armenia and Indonesia showing that observers can deter election-day fraud and otherwise improve the quality of elections; illustrative cases demonstrating that international benefits are contingent on democracy in countries like Haiti, Peru, Togo, and Zimbabwe; and qualitative evidence documenting the escalating game of strategic manipulation among pseudo-democrats, international monitors, and pro-democracy forces. 606 $aElection monitoring 606 $aElections$xCorrupt practices 606 $aDemocratization 606 $aInternational relations 615 0$aElection monitoring. 615 0$aElections$xCorrupt practices. 615 0$aDemocratization. 615 0$aInternational relations. 676 $a324.6/5 686 $aMF 4000$qBVB$2rvk 700 $aHyde$b Susan D$0944461 712 02$aKnowledge Unlatched 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910169194203321 996 $aThe pseudo-democrat's dilemma$92132000 997 $aUNINA