LEADER 02132oam 2200577 450 001 9910696722603321 005 20210728100724.0 035 $a(CKB)5470000002381649 035 $a(OCoLC)760983905 035 $a(EXLCZ)995470000002381649 100 $a20111114j198602 ua 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aStatistical correlation analysis for comparing vibration data from test and analysis /$fT.G. Butler [and three others] 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cNational Aeronautics and Space Administration, Scientific and Technical Information Branch,$dFebruary 1986. 215 $a1 online resource (iii, 88 pages, 1 unnumbered page) $cillustrations 225 1 $aNASA/TM ;$v86081 300 $a"February 1986." 606 $aVibration$2nasat 606 $aComputer programs$2nasat 606 $aCorrelation$2nasat 606 $aStructural analysis (Engineering)$xComputer programs 606 $aVibration$xResearch$xComputer programs 606 $aStatistics$xComputer programs 606 $aStatistics$xComputer programs$2fast 606 $aStructural analysis (Engineering)$xComputer programs$2fast 615 7$aVibration. 615 7$aComputer programs. 615 7$aCorrelation. 615 0$aStructural analysis (Engineering)$xComputer programs. 615 0$aVibration$xResearch$xComputer programs. 615 0$aStatistics$xComputer programs. 615 7$aStatistics$xComputer programs. 615 7$aStructural analysis (Engineering)$xComputer programs. 700 $aButler$b T. G.$01422015 712 02$aUnited States.$bNational Aeronautics and Space Administration.$bScientific and Technical Information Branch, 801 0$bOCLCE 801 1$bOCLCE 801 2$bOCLCQ 801 2$bOCLCO 801 2$bOCLCQ 801 2$bOCLCA 801 2$bOCLCF 801 2$bGPO 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910696722603321 996 $aStatistical correlation analysis for comparing vibration data from test and analysis$93545030 997 $aUNINA LEADER 03465nam 22004573 450 001 9910163356903321 005 20230803215314.0 010 $a9781782897262 010 $a1782897267 035 $a(CKB)3810000000098013 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5626027 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL5626027 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11642274 035 $a(OCoLC)1080999120 035 $a(Perlego)3017805 035 $a(EXLCZ)993810000000098013 100 $a20210901d2014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aAnzio (Operation Shingle) 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aChicago :$cLucknow Books,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014. 215 $a1 online resource (44 pages) 327 $aIntro -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- ABSTRACT -- PREFACE -- CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION -- Strategic Framework -- CHAPTER II - DECISION -- CHAPTER III - PLANNING AND PREPARATION -- Command Relationships -- Concept of Operations -- Planning -- Preparation -- CHAPTER IV - OPERATIONS AT ANZIO -- Battle Ashore -- German Counterattack -- Breakout from Anzio -- Advance to Rome -- CHAPTER V - OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED -- APPENDIX I - ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE -- APPENDIX II - GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE -- REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER -- BIBLIOGRAPHY. 330 8 $aThis case study analyzes the role of operational art in Allied operations at Anzio, Italy and the battle for Rome (January 22-June 4, 1944). As part of the Allied Campaign in Italy, the amphibious assault on Anzio-code-named Operation Shingle, and the subsequent drive to Rome remains one of the most controversial military operations in history. Although the Allies eventually captured Rome from the Germans, the failure to use 'operational thinking' led to a poorly planned and executed operation. Most historical accounts blame the failures at Anzio on the lack of aggressiveness by the Operation Shingle commander Major General John P. Lucas. However, when viewed in the larger context of the strategy to defeat Germany and the Allied Campaign in Italy, Operation Shingle is a showcase of failure at the operational level of war. Political rather than military considerations drove Shingle-dooming the operation from the start. Anzio demonstrates the importance of linking tactical actions to operational and strategic objectives. At the strategic level of war, the Allies had a sound strategy to defeat Germany. However, at the operational level of war, the decision to launch Shingle did not adequately assess risk. In operational design, commanders failed to define an objective, lacked sufficient mass, and did not include alternative plans based on potential enemy actions. During planning and preparation, the Allies misjudged the enemy's center of gravity and failed to exploit valuable intelligence. During execution, operational leadership lacked initiative. Finally, the complexity and tensions created by the combined operation made unity of effort difficult. These lessons should benefit future operations. 517 $aAnzio 606 $aOperational art (Military science) 615 0$aOperational art (Military science) 676 $a940.54214999999999 700 $aGray $b Captain Stephen P$01376726 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910163356903321 996 $aAnzio (Operation Shingle)$93412771 997 $aUNINA