LEADER 01888nam 22004453 450 001 9910163354903321 005 20250827080354.0 010 $a9781782898207 010 $a1782898204 035 $a(CKB)3810000000098081 035 $a(BIP)054487315 035 $a(VLeBooks)9781782898207 035 $a(Perlego)3018640 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC32210786 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL32210786 035 $a(Exl-AI)993810000000098081 035 $a(OCoLC)1534811617 035 $a(EXLCZ)993810000000098081 100 $a20250827d2014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aBarbarossa 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWaipu :$cPickle Partners Publishing,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014. 215 $a1 online resource (36 p.) 330 8 $aThe German planning process for the 1941 invasion of Soviet Russia is analyzed through the presentation of the major plans developed from July 1940 until June 1941. The final plan is then critiqued within the context of the applicable Principles of War. The planning process was characterized by significant disagreements between Hitler, the German High Command and the Army High Command. The major points of contention relate to the selection of primary objectives and force deployment patterns. A set of conclusions is presented which argues that the planning process was faulty due to a number of assumptions which were generally held by the officers who were involved in the process. 606 $aOperational art (Military science)$7Generated by AI 615 0$aOperational art (Military science) 700 $aSnively$b John D$01434530 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910163354903321 996 $aBarbarossa$94425246 997 $aUNINA