LEADER 04557oam 22011054 450 001 9910162925603321 005 20230810001926.0 010 $a1-4755-6992-0 010 $a1-4755-6994-7 035 $a(CKB)3710000001045048 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4800308 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2017005 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000001045048 100 $a20020129d2017 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $2rdacontent 182 $2rdamedia 183 $2rdacarrier 200 10$aOn the Determinants of Fiscal Non-Compliance : $eAn Empirical Analysis of Spain?s Regions /$fMar Delgado-Téllez, Victor Lledo, Javier Pérez 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2017. 215 $a1 online resource (34 pages) $cillustrations, tables 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 311 $a1-4755-6984-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 330 3 $aThis paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is applied to Spain?s Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal noncompliance among Spain?s regions has shown to be persistent. It increases with the size of growth forecast errors and the extent to which fiscal targets are tightened, factors not fully under the control of regional governments. Non-compliance also tends to increase during election years, when vertical fiscal imbalances accentuate, and market financing costs subside. Strong fiscal rules have not shown any significant impact in containing fiscal non-compliance. Reducing fiscal non-compliance in multilevel governance systems such as the one in Spain requires a comprehensive assessment of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that looks beyond rules-based frameworks by ensuring enforcement procedures are politically credible. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2017/005 606 $aEconomics 606 $aEconomics$zSpain 606 $aBudgeting$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aPublic Finance$2imf 606 $aNational Budget$2imf 606 $aBudget Systems$2imf 606 $aForecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt$2imf 606 $aState and Local Budget and Expenditures$2imf 606 $aIntergovernmental Relations$2imf 606 $aFederalism$2imf 606 $aSecession$2imf 606 $aFiscal Policy$2imf 606 $aDebt$2imf 606 $aDebt Management$2imf 606 $aSovereign Debt$2imf 606 $aPublic Administration$2imf 606 $aPublic Sector Accounting and Audits$2imf 606 $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf 606 $aBudgeting & financial management$2imf 606 $aGovernment debt management$2imf 606 $aFiscal rules$2imf 606 $aBudget planning and preparation$2imf 606 $aFiscal consolidation$2imf 606 $aFiscal risks$2imf 606 $aPublic financial management (PFM)$2imf 606 $aFiscal policy$2imf 606 $aDebts, Public$2imf 606 $aBudget$2imf 607 $aSpain$2imf 615 0$aEconomics. 615 0$aEconomics 615 7$aBudgeting 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aPublic Finance 615 7$aNational Budget 615 7$aBudget Systems 615 7$aForecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt 615 7$aState and Local Budget and Expenditures 615 7$aIntergovernmental Relations 615 7$aFederalism 615 7$aSecession 615 7$aFiscal Policy 615 7$aDebt 615 7$aDebt Management 615 7$aSovereign Debt 615 7$aPublic Administration 615 7$aPublic Sector Accounting and Audits 615 7$aPublic finance & taxation 615 7$aBudgeting & financial management 615 7$aGovernment debt management 615 7$aFiscal rules 615 7$aBudget planning and preparation 615 7$aFiscal consolidation 615 7$aFiscal risks 615 7$aPublic financial management (PFM) 615 7$aFiscal policy 615 7$aDebts, Public 615 7$aBudget 676 $a330 700 $aDelgado-Téllez$b Mar$01378740 701 $aLledo$b Victor$0495905 701 $aPérez$b Javier$0422393 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910162925603321 996 $aOn the Determinants of Fiscal Non-Compliance$93650696 997 $aUNINA