LEADER 00935nam0-22003251i-450- 001 990007861320403321 005 20080220102240.0 010 $a88-424-9455-0 035 $a000786132 035 $aFED01000786132 035 $a(Aleph)000786132FED01 035 $a000786132 100 $a20040310d1998----km-y0itay50------ba 101 0 $aita 102 $aIT 105 $ay-------001yb 200 1 $aPiero Martinetti$ela metafisica civile di un filosofo dimenticato$econ un'appendice di documenti inediti$fAmedeo Vigorelli 210 $aMilano$cB. Mondadori$d1998 215 $a423 p.$d17 cm 225 1 $aTesti e pretesti 610 0 $aMartinetti, Piero 676 $a195$v21$zita 700 1$aVigorelli,$bAmedeo$f<1950- >$0119403 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990007861320403321 952 $aP.1 FG 1143$fFLFBC 959 $aFLFBC 996 $aPiero Martinetti$9673657 997 $aUNINA LEADER 03338nam 22004933 450 001 9910158952403321 005 20230801235413.0 010 $a9781786253804 010 $a1786253801 035 $a(CKB)3710000001011478 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4807340 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4807340 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11348159 035 $a(OCoLC)974582845 035 $a(Perlego)3018191 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000001011478 100 $a20210901d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aNaval Support To Grant's Campaign Of 1864-65 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aSan Francisco :$cGolden Springs Publishing,$d2012. 210 4$dİ2012. 215 $a1 online resource (48 pages) 327 $aIntro -- Table Of Contents -- ABSTRACT -- INTRODUCTION -- THEATER OF WAR SETTING -- THE CAMPAIGN -- ANALYSIS -- Intellectual Component -- Psychological-Physical Component -- Cybernetic Component -- Harmonic Component -- CONCLUSIONS -- APPENDIX A -- APPENDIX B -- APPENDIX C -- BIBLIOGRAPHY. 330 8 $aBy 1863, the Civil War was basically a stalemate between the two belligerents. Though the Union forces had achieved some success in conducting joint expeditions that resulted in securing the Mississippi River and the majority of the Southern ports, the major land armies of the Union were generally ineffective. In March 1864, General Ulysses S. Grant was named General-in-Chief of the Union army; he designed a campaign for future operations that called for synchronized operations by the Union armies supported by the Union navy. This monograph examines the naval support to Grant's campaign to determine whether or not the provided support was by design or just coincidence.The monograph initially establishes the theater of war setting that Grant inherited when he assumed the billet of General-in-Chief. This is followed by a summary of the campaign from a naval perspective. The monograph concludes with an analysis of the naval support provided to the campaign using the four components of a successful campaign espoused in Lieutenant Colonel James Dubik's "A Guide to the Study of Operational Art and Campaign Design."Based on the analysis, it is evident that the naval support was provided by design. Grant demonstrated an extraordinary ability to visualize operations in the entire theater of war. He fully understood and appreciated the usefulness of the sea dimension and exploited its use. The Union navy's command of the seas and resourcefulness allowed Grant to maintain his freedom of action, to operate from secure bases of operation, and to destroy the South's capacity to wage war. 517 $aNaval Support To Grant's Campaign Of 1864-65 517 $aNaval Support To Grant?s Campaign Of 1864-65 606 $aOperational art (Military science) 606 $aMilitary operations, Naval 615 0$aOperational art (Military science) 615 0$aMilitary operations, Naval. 676 $a973.75 700 $aMurdock USMC$b Lt.-Col. Harry M$01373106 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910158952403321 996 $aNaval Support To Grant's Campaign Of 1864-65$93404034 997 $aUNINA