LEADER 01118nam0-22003611i-450- 001 990002580210403321 035 $a000258021 035 $aFED01000258021 035 $a(Aleph)000258021FED01 035 $a000258021 100 $a20000920d1928----km-y0itay50------ba 101 0 $aENG 200 1 $aTraite d' Analyse$fEmile Picard. 205 $a3.ed. 210 $aParis$cGauthier Villars$d1928. 215 $a3 v.$d25 cm 300 $aVol. 1. : Integrales simples et multiples. L'equation de Laplace. xvii, 503 p. - Vol. 2. : Fonction harmonique. Equations differentielles. 300 $axi, 623 p. - Vol. 3. : Equations differentielles. Equations lineaires. vii, 659 p. 610 0 $aOpere 610 0 $aTrattati 610 0 $aRaccolte 676 $a510 700 1$aPicard,$bÉmile$f<1856-1941>$0332010 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990002580210403321 952 $aMXXIX-A-289$b5646c$fMAS 952 $aMXXIX-A-290$b5646b$fMAS 952 $aMXXIX-A-291$b5646a$fMAS 959 $aMAS 996 $aTraité d' analyse$9380392 997 $aUNINA DB $aING01 LEADER 04237nam 22005053 450 001 9910158800903321 005 20230807220256.0 010 $a9781786250650 010 $a1786250659 035 $a(CKB)3810000000099062 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4807940 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4807940 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11354498 035 $a(OCoLC)975223371 035 $a(Perlego)3018300 035 $a(EXLCZ)993810000000099062 100 $a20210901d2015 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aForest Brothers, 1945 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aSan Francisco :$cVerdun Press,$d2015. 210 4$d©2015. 215 $a1 online resource (38 pages) 327 $aIntro -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS -- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY -- Introduction -- The First Soviet Occupation -- German Occupation and Operation Bagration -- The Third "Liberation" -- The "Forest Brothers" -- Hope and Motivation -- Soviet Measures against the Resistance -- Culmination -- Conclusions -- APPENDIX A - 1941 NKVD deportation priorities: Groups considered a threat to the occupation -- APPENDIX B. - Partisan military districts -- APPENDIX C - Theoretical Appendix: A Case Study in Flexibility and Security -- People and Ideology -- Flexibility -- Security -- Conclusions -- APPENDIX D. - Chekist data: Number of Nationalist underground command centers dismantled -- regional and district staff members captured or killed by the Soviet campaign -- APPENDIX E. - Chekist data: Number of partisan operations conducted -- partisans killed, captured, arrested and given amnesty -- APPENDIX F. - Chekist data: Number of captured weapon systems by Soviets -- BIBLIOGRAPHY. 330 8 $aAlthough the resistance effort maintained its strength ideologically, the Lithuanian partisan movement never recovered from the culminating point in 1945 because of a shortfall in resources, a lack of external support, and the inability of resistance leadership to adapt rapidly enough against a comprehensive Soviet assimilation campaign.While many authors argue that the high point in the Lithuanian partisan war occurred between 1946 and 1947, the totality of evidence points towards a culmination in 1945 from which the effort never recovered. This culminating point may be attributed to a miscalculation of partisan resources on the part of their leadership as well as a lack of external support. The main reason for achieving culmination, however, rested in the inability of partisans to fight a conventional war against a massive, combined arms Soviet force. Mass deportations between three separate occupations and a wave of 60, 000 escapees created a vacuum of political, military and moral leadership. Compounded with the realization that there would be no external support from the democratic West, the will of the Lithuanians was bent by the Soviet campaign. Ultimately, the numbers of partisans killed, captured or given amnesty by Soviet forces reflect an apex in military capability in 1945 that drastically diminished thereafter.The pinnacle of partisan effort in 1945 clearly represents a culminating point that forced the Lithuanian resistance movement to shift their operations drastically. Ultimately, based on the totality of evidence, the 1945 culminating point splits the resistance into two stages: 1) 1944-1945-conventional war operations, a period of traditional offensive warfare by an organized partisan movement; and 2) 1946-1953-irregular warfare operations, a period of unremitting decline by a significantly diminished resistance, relegated to a more defensive posture and small scale offensive operations. 517 $aForest Brothers, 1945 606 $aUnderground movements, War 606 $aGuerrillas 606 $aInsurgency 615 0$aUnderground movements, War. 615 0$aGuerrillas. 615 0$aInsurgency. 676 $a947.93083999999999 700 $aLeskys$b Major Vylius M$01374066 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910158800903321 996 $aForest Brothers, 1945$93406874 997 $aUNINA