LEADER 03170nam 22004573 450 001 9910158777803321 005 20230803215317.0 010 $a9781782899280 010 $a1782899286 035 $a(CKB)3810000000098155 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4809464 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4809464 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11348990 035 $a(OCoLC)974590656 035 $a(Perlego)3020755 035 $a(EXLCZ)993810000000098155 100 $a20210901d2014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aAntietam And Gettysburg 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aSan Francisco :$cGolden Springs Publishing,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014. 215 $a1 online resource (33 pages) 327 $aIntro -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- Abstract -- I. THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR. -- II. TACTICAL RESERVES AND THE SEEDS OF OPERATIONAL INERTIA -- III. STRATEGIC CONFUSION AND THE OPERATIONAL VOID. -- IV. CONCLUSION -- BIBLIOGRAPHY. 330 8 $aThe Battles of Antietam and Gettysburg are widely recognized as tactical victories for the Union's Army of the Potomac. Following both battles, however, the respective commanding generals. General McClellan and General Meade, were sharply criticized for having failed to vigorously pursue General Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia in order to deliver a decisive blow. Both Union commanders offered a list of extenuating circumstances, such as battle fatigue, large casualties and lack of supplies, which precluded a "premature" pursuit of General Lee.Upon examination, however, their inability to conceptualize a decisive pursuit of General Lee's army points to a direct failure at the operational level of War. Both Union generals were unable to link their tactical victories to any larger strategic objective. The reasons for this from the strategic confusion of a conflict evolving from limited War to total War, and from the void in operational training that left both McClellan and Meade ill prepared to perform successfully at this critical level of Warfare.Examining this operational void, it becomes apparent that a commander's construct of War must be complete, that is, fully cognizant of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of War, in order to achieve success beyond the limits of the tactical battlefield. Such an examination points to the criticality of the operational level of Warfare, highlights the importance of the commander's concept of operations and suggests that an operational commander must grow in the sense that his cognitive processes must be tuned into the dynamics of his environment, not only on a tactical level, but on the operational and strategic level. 517 $aAntietam And Gettysburg 606 $aMilitary campaigns 615 0$aMilitary campaigns. 676 $a973.73490000000004 700 $aBlack USN$b Lt.-Cmdr Stephen P$01377947 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910158777803321 996 $aAntietam And Gettysburg$93415715 997 $aUNINA