LEADER 03405nam 22004693 450 001 9910158775003321 005 20230803215313.0 010 $a9781786250391 010 $a178625039X 035 $a(CKB)3810000000099043 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4809440 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4809440 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11348985 035 $a(OCoLC)974590579 035 $a(Perlego)3018057 035 $a(EXLCZ)993810000000099043 100 $a20210901d2014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe Operational Implications Of Deception At The Battle Of Kursk 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aSan Francisco :$cLucknow Books,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014. 215 $a1 online resource (43 pages) 327 $aIntro -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- Abstract -- INTRODUCTION -- DECEPTION -- CURRENT DOCTRINE -- KURSK OVERVIEW -- GERMAN DECEPTION -- SOVIET PLANS -- SOVIET DECEPTION -- ANALYSIS -- AIM -- INTELLIGENCE -- CENTRALIZED CONTROL -- SYNCHRONIZATION -- OPERATIONS SECURITY -- CONCLUSION -- IMPLICATIONS -- RECOMMENDATIONS -- Maps -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- BOOKS -- Manuals -- Articles and Unpublished Manuscripts. 330 8 $aThis monograph analyzes the use of deception by the Germans and Soviets in the battle of Kursk. It uses a paradigm consisting of: commander's aim, intelligence, centralized control, synchronization and operations security to determine why Soviet deception succeeded and German deception failed. The analysis provides insights into the use of operational deception on the modern battlefield.The conclusions of this monograph suggest that: operational deception is not a separate deception activity; that it can be used in the offense or defense; that it can be a viable combat multiplier today and that deception is an acquired Skill. The study monograph shows that operational deception must organize and control the deception efforts at the tactical level and that simple battlefield deception techniques can produce an operational effect.The monograph shows the critical role commanders have in establishing an appropriate course of action that sets the stage for deception. The selected course of action must provide a picture of duplicity to the enemy commander by presenting two possible objectives. This concept of alternative objectives allows the deception activity to flow naturally from the COA and confuse the enemy.The monograph recommends incorporation of deception into the officer corps professional development through professional reading programs in schools and practical application at the National Training Center. Combat Maneuver Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center and the Battle Command Training Program. It also recommends that the Army develop and field sufficient communications and non-communications' devices to allow Army Groups to simulate a U.S. Corps. 606 $aMilitary campaigns 606 $aDeception (Military science) 615 0$aMilitary campaigns. 615 0$aDeception (Military science) 676 $a355.41 700 $aElder$b Major James E$01376714 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910158775003321 996 $aThe Operational Implications Of Deception At The Battle Of Kursk$93412759 997 $aUNINA