LEADER 01033nam0-22002891i-450- 001 990003862940403321 005 20080118100350.0 035 $a000386294 035 $aFED01000386294 035 $a(Aleph)000386294FED01 035 $a000386294 100 $a20030910d1968----km-y0itay50------ba 101 0 $aeng$afre$aspa 102 $aIT 200 1 $aWorld grain trade statistics 1967-68$eexports by source and destination 1967-68$d= Statistiques du commerce mondial des crales 1967-68$eexportations par provenance et par destination 1967-68$d= Estadisticas del comercio mundial de cereales 1967-68$eexportaciones por origen y destino 1967-68$fFAO 210 $aRoma$cFAO$d1968 215 $a77 p.$d28 cm 610 0 $aCommercio internazionale$aStatistiche 610 0 $aProdotti agricoli 710 02$aFAO$017670 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990003862940403321 952 $aO/3 WOR$b042516$fSES 959 $aSES 996 $aWorld grain trade statistics 1967-68$9514572 997 $aUNINA LEADER 04905nam 22005053 450 001 9910158774903321 005 20250505152555.0 010 $a9781786250421 010 $a178625042X 035 $a(CKB)3810000000099045 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4809193 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4809193 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11354619 035 $a(OCoLC)975224111 035 $a(BIP)054259890 035 $a(Perlego)3018076 035 $a(EXLCZ)993810000000099045 100 $a20250505d2014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aAugust storm $ethe Soviet strategic offensive in Manchuria, 1945 /$fDavid M. Glantz 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$a[Potomac, Maryland] :$cPickle Partners publishing,$d[2014] 210 4$dİ2014 215 $a1 online resource (232 pages) 327 $aIntro -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- FOREWORD -- Illustrations -- Maps -- Figure -- Tables -- Abbreviations -- Soviet Forces -- Japanese Forces -- Symbols -- Soviet -- Japanese -- Introduction -- 1 - Army Penetration Operations -- The Route -- Missions and Tasks -- Japanese Defenses -- Operational Planning -- 5th Army Attack -- Conclusions -- 2 - Division Advance in Heavily Wooded Mountains -- Terrain -- Missions and Tasks -- Japanese Defenses -- Operational Planning -- Combat and Combat Service Support -- 1st Red Banner Army Attack -- Conclusions -- 3 - Army Operations in Swampy Lowlands -- Terrain -- Missions and Tasks -- Japanese Defenses -- Operational Planning -- 35th Army Attack -- Conclusions -- 4 - Set Piece Battle -- The Setting -- 1st Red Banner Army Advance -- 5th Army Advance -- Battle of Mutanchiang -- Conclusions -- 5 - Reduction of a Fortified Region -- Hutou: Strategic Significance -- Japanese Forces -- Soviet Forces -- Soviet 35th Army Attack -- Conclusions -- 6 - Army Operations in Arid Mountains -- Situation in Western Manchuria -- Missions and Tasks -- Japanese Defenses -- Soviet Operational Planning -- 39th Army Attack -- Conclusions -- 7 - Forward Detachment Deep Operations -- Situation in Northwestern Manchuria -- Japanese Defenses -- Missions and Tasks -- Operational Planning -- 36th Army Attack -- Conclusions -- 8 - Joint Ground and Riverine Operations -- Situation in Northeastern Manchuria -- Japanese Defenses -- Missions and Tasks -- 15th Army Attack -- Conclusions -- 9 - Conclusions -- Use of Terrain -- Surprise -- Maneuver -- Task Organization of Units -- The Author -- COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE -- Synopsis of Leavenworth Paper 8. 330 8 $a[Includes 15 tables, 1 tables, 26 maps]In August 1945, only three months after the rumble of gunfire had subsided in Europe, Soviet armies launched massive attacks on Japanese forces in Manchuria. In a lightning campaign that lasted but ten days, Soviet forces ruptured Japanese defenses on a 4,000-kilometer front, paralyzed Japanese command and control, and plunged through 450 kilometers of forbidding terrain into the heartland of Manchuria. Effective Soviet cover and deception masked the scale of offensive preparations and produced strategic surprise. Imaginative tailoring of units to terrain, flexible combat formations, and bold maneuvers by armor-heavy, task-organized forward detachments and mobile groups produced operational and tactical surprise and, ultimately, rapid and total Soviet victory.For the Soviet Army, the Manchurian offensive was a true postgraduate combat exercise. The Soviets had to display all the operational and tactical techniques they had learned in four years of bitter fighting in the west. Though the offensive culminated an education, it also emerged as a clear case study of how a nation successfully begins a war in a race against the clock arid not only against an enemy, but also against hindering terrain.Soviet military historians and theorists have recently focused on the Manchurian offensive, a theater case study characterized by deep mobile operations on a broad front designed to pre-empt and overcome defenses. Because these characteristics appear relevant to current theater operations, the Soviets study the more prominent operational and tactical techniques used in Manchuria in 1945. What is of obvious interest to the Soviet military professional should be of interest to the U.S. officer as well. 606 $aWorld War, 1939-1945$xCampaigns$zChina$zManchuria 606 $aWorld War, 1939-1945$zSoviet Union 607 $aManchuria (China)$xHistory$y1931-1945 607 $aSoviet Union$xHistory, Military 615 0$aWorld War, 1939-1945$xCampaigns 615 0$aWorld War, 1939-1945 676 $a940.5425 700 $aGlantz$b David M.$0610066 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910158774903321 996 $aAugust storm$94398447 997 $aUNINA