LEADER 01056nam--2200349---450 001 990002987210203316 005 20220518110559.0 010 $a90-429-1309-6 035 $a000298721 035 $aUSA01000298721 035 $a(ALEPH)000298721USA01 035 $a000298721 100 $a20071011h2003----km-y0itay50------ba 101 $afre 102 $aFR 105 $aa---||||001yy 200 1 $a<> laine et le parfum$eépinetra et alabastres forme, iconographie et fonction$erecherche de céramique attique féminine$fPanayota Badinou 210 $aLouvain [etc.]$cPeeters$d2003 215 $aXVI, 395 p.$cill.$d27 cm 225 2 $aMonographs on antiquity$v2 410 0$12001$aMonographs on antiquity 606 0 $aPittura greca 606 0 $aCeramica greca 676 $a738.3820938 700 1$aBADINOU,$bPanayota$0477719 801 0$aIT$bsalbc$gISBD 912 $a990002987210203316 951 $aXI.3.B. 445$b200465 L.M.$cXI.3.$d00062829 959 $aBK 969 $aUMA 996 $aLaine et le parfum$9240816 997 $aUNISA LEADER 03344nam 2200601 450 001 9910155085103321 005 20201023111955.0 010 $a1-350-00461-8 010 $a1-350-00460-X 010 $a1-350-00457-X 024 7 $a10.5040/9781350004610 035 $a(CKB)4340000000024108 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4768832 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6162013 035 $a(OCoLC)1201426411 035 $a(CaBNVSL)mat50004610 035 $a(CaBNVSL)9781350004610 035 $a(EXLCZ)994340000000024108 100 $a20201023d2020 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $2rdacontent 182 $2rdamedia 183 $2rdacarrier 200 10$aMotivation ethics /$fMathew Coakley 210 1$aLondon, England :$cBloomsbury Academic,$d2020. 210 2$aLondon, England :$cBloomsbury Publishing,$d2020 215 $a1 online resource (265 pages) 311 $a1-350-00458-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages [253]-256) and index. 327 $aConsequentialism and the moral agent question -- Motivation ethics -- Deontology and the moral agent question -- Moral demandingness and two concepts of evaluation -- The problem of special relationships -- Global duties and the state -- Legitimacy and the good -- Interpersonal comparisons of the good -- On the scope of reason. 330 $aThis is a book about a particular moral theory--motivation ethics--and why we should accept it. But it is also a book about moral theorizing, about how we might compare different structures of moral theory. In principle we might morally evaluate a range of objects: we might, for example, evaluate what people do--is some action right, wrong, permitted, forbidden, a duty or beyond what is required? Or we might evaluate agents: what is it to be morally heroic, or morally depraved, or highly moral? And, we could evaluate institutions: which ones are just, or morally better, or legitimate? Most theories focus on one (or two) of these and offer arguments against rivals. What this book does is to step back and ask a different question: of the theories that evaluate one object, are they compatible with an acceptable account of the evaluation of the other objects? So, for instance, if a moral theory tells us which actions are right and wrong, can it then be compatible with a theory of what it is to be a morally good or bad or heroic or depraved agent (or deny the need for this)? It seems that this would be an easy task, but the book sets out how this is very difficult for some of our most prominent theories, why this is so, and why a theory based on motivations might be the right answer. --$cProvided by publisher. 606 $aEthics 606 $aMotivation (Psychology) 606 $aMoral motivation 606 $aConsequentialism (Ethics) 606 $aDuty 606 $aEthics & moral philosophy$2bicssc 615 0$aEthics. 615 0$aMotivation (Psychology) 615 0$aMoral motivation. 615 0$aConsequentialism (Ethics) 615 0$aDuty. 615 7$aEthics & moral philosophy 676 $a171/.5 700 $aCoakley$b Mathew$01207988 801 0$bDLC 801 1$bCaBNVSL 801 2$bCaBNVSL 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910155085103321 996 $aMotivation ethics$92786930 997 $aUNINA