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010   $a1-4755-5578-4
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035   $a(CKB)3710000000973034
035   $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4867571
035   $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4867571
035   $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11391095
035   $a(CaONFJC)MIL974480
035   $a(OCoLC)965708779
035   $a(IMF)WPIEA2016230
035   $a(EXLCZ)993710000000973034
100   $a20020129d2016      uf         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurcnu||||||||
181   $2rdacontent
182   $2rdamedia
183   $2rdacarrier
200 10$aFiscal Discipline and Exchange Rates : $eDoes Politics Matter? /$fJoão Tovar Jalles, Carlos Mulas-Granados, José Tavares
210  1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2016.
215   $a1 online resource (30 pages) $cillustrations, tables
225 1 $aIMF Working Papers
311   $a1-4755-5576-8 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
330 3 $aWe look at the effect of exchange rate regimes on fiscal discipline, taking into account the effect  of underlying political conditions. We present a model where strong politics (defined as  policymakers facing longer political horizon and higher cohesion) are associated with better fiscal  performance, but fixed exchange rates may revert this result and lead to less fiscal discipline. We  confirm these hypotheses through regression analysis performed on a panel sample covering 79  countries from 1975 to 2012. Our empirical results also show that the positive effect of strong  politics on fiscal discipline is not enough to counter the negative impact of being at/moving to  fixed exchange rates. Finally, we use the synthetic control method to illustrate how the transition  from flexible to fully fixed exchange rate under the Euro impacted negatively fiscal discipline in  European countries. Our results are robust to a number of important sensitivity checks, including  different estimators, alternative proxies for fiscal discipline, and sub-sample analysis.
410  0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2016/230
606   $aForeign exchange rates$xPolitical aspects
606   $aForeign Exchange$2imf
606   $aPublic Finance$2imf
606   $aStructure, Scope, and Performance of Government$2imf
606   $aNational Deficit Surplus$2imf
606   $aDebt$2imf
606   $aDebt Management$2imf
606   $aSovereign Debt$2imf
606   $aCurrency$2imf
606   $aForeign exchange$2imf
606   $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf
606   $aExchange rate arrangements$2imf
606   $aConventional peg$2imf
606   $aGovernment asset and liability management$2imf
606   $aExchange rate flexibility$2imf
606   $aExchange rates$2imf
606   $aPublic financial management (PFM)$2imf
606   $aFinance, Public$2imf
607   $aAustria$2imf
615  0$aForeign exchange rates$xPolitical aspects.
615  7$aForeign Exchange
615  7$aPublic Finance
615  7$aStructure, Scope, and Performance of Government
615  7$aNational Deficit Surplus
615  7$aDebt
615  7$aDebt Management
615  7$aSovereign Debt
615  7$aCurrency
615  7$aForeign exchange
615  7$aPublic finance & taxation
615  7$aExchange rate arrangements
615  7$aConventional peg
615  7$aGovernment asset and liability management
615  7$aExchange rate flexibility
615  7$aExchange rates
615  7$aPublic financial management (PFM)
615  7$aFinance, Public
676   $a332.45
700   $aJalles$b João Tovar$01378689
701   $aMulas-Granados$b Carlos$0502576
701   $aTavares$b José$01451324
801  0$bDcWaIMF
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910155013103321
996   $aFiscal Discipline and Exchange Rates$93651459
997   $aUNINA