LEADER 03680nam 2200565 450 001 9910154682903321 005 20230106004327.0 010 $a1-5036-0162-5 024 7 $a10.1515/9781503601628 035 $a(CKB)3710000000971829 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4771434 035 $a(DE-B1597)564031 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781503601628 035 $a(OCoLC)1198930012 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000971829 100 $a20160622h20172017 uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $2rdacontent 182 $2rdamedia 183 $2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe politics of weapons inspections $eassessing WMD monitoring and verification regimes /$fNathan E. Busch, Joseph F. Pilat 210 1$aStanford, California :$cStanford University Press,$d[2017] 210 4$dİ2017 215 $a1 online resource (401 pages) 311 $a1-5036-0160-9 311 $a0-8047-9743-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aWhat are monitoring and verification regimes? -- South Africa -- Iraq -- Libya -- Verifying global disarmament -- Applying lessons to the "difficult cases" : North Korea, Iran, and Syria -- Conclusion : strengthening monitoring and verification regimes. 330 $aGiven recent controversies over suspected WMD programs in proliferating countries, there is an increasingly urgent need for effective monitoring and verification regimes?the international mechanisms, including on-site inspections, intended in part to clarify the status of WMD programs in suspected proliferators. Yet the strengths and limitations of these nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms remain unclear. How should these regimes best be implemented? What are the technological, political, and other limitations to these tools? What technologies and other innovations should be utilized to make these regimes most effective? How should recent developments, such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal or Syria's declared renunciation and actual use of its chemical weapons, influence their architecture? The Politics of Weapons Inspections examines the successes, failures, and lessons that can be learned from WMD monitoring and verification regimes in order to help determine how best to maintain and strengthen these regimes in the future. In addition to examining these regimes' technological, political, and legal contexts, Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat reevaluate the track record of monitoring and verification in the historical cases of South Africa, Libya, and Iraq; assess the prospects of using these mechanisms in verifying arms control and disarmament; and apply the lessons learned from these cases to contemporary controversies over suspected or confirmed programs in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Finally, they provide a forward-looking set of policy recommendations for the future. 606 $aWeapons of mass destruction 606 $aNuclear arms control$xVerification 606 $aChemical arms control$xVerification 606 $aBiological arms control$xVerification 606 $aDisarmament$xOn-site inspection 615 0$aWeapons of mass destruction. 615 0$aNuclear arms control$xVerification. 615 0$aChemical arms control$xVerification. 615 0$aBiological arms control$xVerification. 615 0$aDisarmament$xOn-site inspection. 676 $a327.1/745 700 $aBusch$b Nathan E.$f1971-$01208758 702 $aPilat$b Joseph F. 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910154682903321 996 $aThe politics of weapons inspections$92788870 997 $aUNINA