LEADER 03182nam 22006132 450 001 9910150185903321 005 20160711132447.0 010 $a1-316-68748-1 010 $a1-316-68898-4 010 $a1-316-68923-9 010 $a1-316-68948-4 010 $a1-316-68973-5 010 $a1-316-69048-2 010 $a1-316-67017-1 035 $a(CKB)3710000000741656 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001697410 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)16547258 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001697410 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)14939033 035 $a(PQKB)25100028 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9781316670170 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4732891 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000741656 100 $a20151202d2016|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aCommanding military power $eorganizing for victory and defeat on the battlefield /$fRyan Grauer 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2016. 215 $a1 online resource (xiii, 263 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 04 Jul 2016). 311 1 $a1-107-15821-4 311 1 $a1-316-61172-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aCommanding military power -- Liaoyang -- Huai-Hai campaign -- The 5th Phase Offensive -- The 3rd Phase Offensive -- Conclusion. 330 $aCommanding Military Power offers a new explanation of why some armed forces are stronger than others. Ryan Grauer advances a 'command structure theory' which combines insights from organization theory, international relations, and security studies literatures to provide a unique perspective on military power. Specifically, armed forces organized to facilitate swift and accurate perception of and response to battlefield developments will cope better with war's inherent uncertainty, use resources effectively, and, quite often, win. Case studies of battles from the Russo-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War and Korean War, based on new archival research, underscore the argument, showing that even smaller and materially weaker militaries can fight effectively against and defeat larger and better endowed adversaries when they are organizationally prepared to manage uncertainty. That organization often matters more than numbers and specific tools of war has crucial implications for both contemporary and future thinking about and efforts to improve martial strength. 606 $aCommand of troops$vCase studies 606 $aLiaoyang, Battle of, Liaoyang, China, 1904 606 $aHuai Hai Campaign, China, 1948-1949 606 $aKorean War, 1950-1953$xCampaigns$zKorea 615 0$aCommand of troops 615 0$aLiaoyang, Battle of, Liaoyang, China, 1904. 615 0$aHuai Hai Campaign, China, 1948-1949. 615 0$aKorean War, 1950-1953$xCampaigns 676 $a951.904/24 700 $aGrauer$b Ryan$f1983-$01075065 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910150185903321 996 $aCommanding military power$92583529 997 $aUNINA