LEADER 05913oam 2200589 450 001 9910143469003321 005 20210713230535.0 010 $a3-540-49646-7 024 7 $a10.1007/3-540-49646-7 035 $a(CKB)1000000000211015 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000322115 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11232341 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000322115 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10282518 035 $a(PQKB)11629934 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-540-49646-5 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3072247 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6486044 035 $a(PPN)155221779 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000211015 100 $a20210713d1998 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurnn|008mamaa 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 00$aComputer safety, reliability and security $e17th international conference, safecomp'98, heidelberg, germany, october 5-7, 1998 : proceedings /$fedited by Wolfgang Ehrenberger 205 $a1st ed. 1998. 210 1$aBerlin, Germany ;$aNew York, New York :$cSpringer,$d[1998] 210 4$d©1998 215 $a1 online resource (XVI, 404 p.) 225 1 $aLecture Notes in Computer Science,$x0302-9743 ;$v1516 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a3-540-65110-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aFormal Methods I - Analysis and Specification -- CoRSA - A Constraint Based Approach to Requirements and Safety Analysis -- An Agenda for Specifying Software Components with Complex Data Models -- Safety in Production Cell Components: An Approach Combining Formal Real Time Specifications and Patterns -- Safety Properties Ensured by the OASIS Model for Safety Critical Real-Time Systems -- Linking Hazard Analysis to Formal Specification and Design in B -- Management and Human Factors -- Controlling Your Design through Your Software Process -- Operator Errors and Their Causes -- Security -- A Performance Comparison of Group Security Mechanisms -- Towards Secure Downloadable Executable Content: The JAVA Paradigm -- Model and Implementation of a Secure SW-Development Process for Mission Critical Software -- Impact of Object-Oriented Software Engineering Applied to the Development of Security Systems -- Medical Informatics -- ?Profit by Safety? or Quackery in Biomedical Information Technology? -- Formal Methods II - Languages and Verification -- Towards Automated Proof of Fail-Safe Behavior -- Verifying a time-triggered protocol in a multi-language environment -- Methods and Languages for Safety Related Real Time Programming -- ANSI-C in Safety Critical Applications Lessons-Learned from Software Evaluation -- Applications -- A Structured Approach to the Formal Certification of Safety of Computer Aided Development Tools -- Applying Formal Methods in Industry The UseGat Project -- Increasing System Safety for By-Wire Applications in Vehicles by Using a Time Triggered Architecture -- Fault-Tolerant Communication in Large-Scale Manipulators -- Distributed Fault Tolerant and Safety Critical Applications in Vehicles - A Time-Triggered Approach -- Model Checking Safety Critical Software with SPIN: an Application to a Railway Interlocking System -- EURIS, a Specification Method for Distributed Interlockings -- Object Oriented Safety Analysis of an Extra High Voltage Substation Bay -- Formal Methods III - Petri Nets -- Integration of Logical and Physical Properties of Embedded Systems by Use of Time Petri Nets -- Safety Verification of Software Using Structured Petri Nets -- Reliability -- Refinement of Safety-Related Hazards into Verifiable Code Assertions -- Conceptual Comparison of two Commonly Used Safeguarding Principles -- A Holistic View on the Dependability of Software-Intensive Systems -- Verifying Integrity of Decision Diagrams. 330 $aComputers and their interactions are becoming the characteristic features of our time: Many people believe that the industrial age is going over into the information age. In the same way as life of the beginning of this century was dominated by machines, factories, streets and railways, the starting century will be characterised by computers and their networks. This change naturally affects also the institutions and the installations our lives depend upon: power plants, including nuclear ones, chemical plants, mechanically working factories, cars, railways and medical equipment; they all depend on computers and their connections. In some cases it is not human life that may be endangered by computer failure, but large investments; e. g. if a whole plant interrupts its production for a long time. In addition to loss of life and property one must not neglect public opinion, which is very critical in many countries against major technical defects. The related computer technology, its hardware, software and production process differ between standard applications and safety related ones: In the safety case it is normally not only the manufacturers and the customers that are involved, but a third party, usually an assessor, who is taking care of the public interest on behalf of a state authority. Usually safety engineers are in a better position than their colleagues from the conventional side, as they may spend more time and money on a particular task and use better equipment. 410 0$aLecture Notes in Computer Science,$x0302-9743 ;$v1516 606 $aComputer systems$xReliability$vCongresses 606 $aComputer security$vCongresses 615 0$aComputer systems$xReliability 615 0$aComputer security 676 $a005.1 702 $aEhrenberger$b W. D. 712 12$aSAFECOMP'98$f(1998 :$eHeidelberg, Germany) 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bUtOrBLW 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910143469003321 996 $aComputer Safety, Reliability, and Security$92175020 997 $aUNINA