LEADER 02804nam 2200373 450 001 9910138163303321 005 20230225211803.0 035 $a(CKB)3230000000017946 035 $a(NjHacI)993230000000017946 035 $a(EXLCZ)993230000000017946 100 $a20230225d2009 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 13$aAn evaluation of the tax-transfer treatment of married couples in European countries /$fHerwig Immervoll [and three others] 210 1$aParis :$cOECD Publishing,$d[2009] 210 4$dİ2009 215 $a1 online resource (59 pages) 225 1 $aOECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers ;$v76 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 330 $aThis paper presents an evaluation of the tax-transfer treatment of married couples in 15 EU countries using the EUROMOD microsimulation model. First, we show that many tax-transfer schemes in Europe feature negative jointness defined as a situation where the tax rate on one person depends negatively on the earnings of the spouse. This stands in contrast to the previous literature on this question, which has focused on a specific form of positive jointness. The presence of negative jointness is driven by family-based and means-tested transfer programs combined with tax systems that usually feature very little jointness. Second, we consider the labor supply distortion on secondary earners relative to primary earners implied by the current tax-transfer systems, and study the welfare effects of small reforms that change the relative taxation of spouses. By adopting a small-reform methodology, it is possible to set out a simple analysis based on more realistic labor supply models than those considered in the existing literature. We present microsimulations showing that simple revenue-neutral reforms that lower the tax burden on secondary earners are associated with substantial welfare gains in most countries. Finally, we consider the tax-transfer implications of marriage and estimate the so-called marriage penalty. For most countries, we find large marriage penalties at the bottom of the distribution driven primarily by features of the transfer system. -- labour supply ; redistribution ; optimal tax ; couples ; marriage tax ; joint taxation. 410 0$aOECD social, employment, and migration working papers ;$v76. 606 $aTaxation$zEurope 615 0$aTaxation 676 $a331.1094 700 $aImmervoll$b Herwig$0146645 801 0$bNjHacI 801 1$bNjHacl 906 $aDOCUMENT 912 $a9910138163303321 996 $aAn evaluation of the tax-transfer treatment of married couples in European countries$93036355 997 $aUNINA