LEADER 02842oam 2200613zu 450 001 9910137466403321 005 20210807002342.0 010 $a2-940503-08-7 024 7 $a10.4000/books.iheid.509 035 $a(CKB)3170000000061016 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001541867 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11876077 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001541867 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11535498 035 $a(PQKB)10739392 035 $a(WaSeSS)IndRDA00045948 035 $a(FrMaCLE)OB-iheid-509 035 $a(oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/56541 035 $a(PPN)182826619 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000061016 100 $a20160829d2012 uy 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe political economy of sovereign default : theory and empirics 210 $cGraduate Institute Publications$d2012 210 31$a[Place of publication not identified]$cGraduate Institute Publications$d2012 215 $a1 online resource (90 pages) 225 0 $aeCahiers de l'Institut ;$v15 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a2-940503-07-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 330 $aWhat do self-interested governments? needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for traditional models of sovereign debt, which rely on the threat of economic sanctions to explain why and when a representative agent seeking to maximise social welfare would choose debt-repayment. The political-economy model of sovereign default developed in this ePaper shows that those governments that depend on small groups of loyalists drawn from large populations are more likely to default on sovereign debt than those governments dependent on large groups of supporters. These findings contribute to a growing body of literature on the importance of institutions in sovereign debt and default. 606 $aPolitical Science$2HILCC 606 $aLaw, Politics & Government$2HILCC 606 $aPublic Finance$2HILCC 610 $arisks 610 $aState | Nation 610 $afinancial globalisation 610 $anon-state actors and civil society 610 $adebt 610 $afinance 610 $agovernance 615 7$aPolitical Science 615 7$aLaw, Politics & Government 615 7$aPublic Finance 700 $aHohmann$b Sebastian$0927650 801 0$bPQKB 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910137466403321 996 $aThe political economy of sovereign default : theory and empirics$92084136 997 $aUNINA