LEADER 03565nam 22006012 450 001 9910136605903321 005 20161103110727.0 010 $a1-316-86695-5 010 $a1-316-86803-6 010 $a1-316-86821-4 010 $a1-316-61737-8 010 $a1-316-69449-6 010 $a1-316-86839-7 010 $a1-316-86911-3 010 $a1-316-86857-5 035 $a(CKB)3710000000894291 035 $a(EBL)4697959 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9781316694497 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4697959 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000894291 100 $a20160128d2016|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aIncentivized development in China $eleaders, governance, and growth in China's counties /$fDavid J. Bulman$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aNew York :$cCambridge University Press,$d2016. 215 $a1 online resource (xiii, 270 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 01 Nov 2016). 311 $a1-107-16629-2 311 $a1-316-86893-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aMachine generated contents note: List of tables; List of figures; Acknowledgements; 1. Introduction; 2. Understanding China's county-level economic growth; 3. Governance for growth: investment attraction and institutional development; 4. First in command: leadership roles for county development; 5. Paths to promotion: the inconsistent importance of economic performance; 6. Ignoring growth: the institutional and economic costs of maintaining stability; 7. Conclusion: a new political economy of uneven regional development; Appendix 1; Appendix 2; Index; Bibliography. 330 $aChina's economy, as a whole, has developed rapidly over the past 35 years, and yet its richest county is over 100 times richer in per capita terms than its poorest county. To explain this vast variation in development, David J. Bulman investigates the political foundations of local economic growth in China, focusing on the institutional and economic roles of county-level leaders and the career incentives that shape their behaviour. Through a close examination of six counties complemented by unique nation-wide data, he presents and explores two related questions: what is the role of County Party Secretaries in determining local governance and growth outcomes? And why do County Party Secretaries emphasize particular developmental priorities? Suitable for scholars of political economy, development economics, and comparative politics, this original study analyzes the relationship between political institutions, local governance, and leadership roles within Chinese government to explain the growing divergence in economic development between counties. 606 $aRegional economics$zChina 606 $aProvincial governments$zChina 606 $aCentral-local government relations$zChina 606 $aEconomic development$zChina 607 $aChina$xEconomic conditions$xRegional disparities 615 0$aRegional economics 615 0$aProvincial governments 615 0$aCentral-local government relations 615 0$aEconomic development 676 $a338.951 686 $aPOL040020$2bisacsh 700 $aBulman$b David Janoff$01074760 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910136605903321 996 $aIncentivized development in China$92581465 997 $aUNINA