LEADER 03926nam 2200625 450 001 9910135394603321 005 20210518004639.0 010 $a3-11-037728-4 024 7 $a10.2478/9783110372656 035 $a(CKB)3810000000000135 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001535975 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11926715 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001535975 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11524163 035 $a(PQKB)11518230 035 $a(WaSeSS)IndRDA00056649 035 $a(DE-B1597)428730 035 $a(OCoLC)1013949402 035 $a(OCoLC)915452254 035 $a(DE-B1597)9783110372656 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1692483 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11054961 035 $a(OCoLC)939262766 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1692483 035 $a(EXLCZ)993810000000000135 100 $a20150531h20142014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn#|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe contents of perceptual experience $ea Kantian perspective /$fAnna Tomaszewska; managing editor, Anna Michalska; language editor, P. Christian Adamski 210 1$aWarsaw, [Poland] ;$aBerlin, [Germany] :$cDe Gruyter Open,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014 215 $a1 online resource (vii, 157 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a3-11-037264-9 311 $a3-11-037265-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tAcknowledgements --$tIntroduction --$t1 The Contents of Perceptual Experience: Opposing Views --$t2 Are the Roots of the Debate Kantian? --$t3 Kant on Nonconceptual Content: Sensations and Intuitions --$t4 Kant on Concepts in Experience --$t5 Nonconceptual Content and Transcendental Idealism --$t6 Kant and Naturalism about the Mind --$tConclusion --$tBibliography --$tIndex 330 $aThe book addresses the debate on whether the representational content of perceptual experience is conceptual or non-conceptual, by bringing out the points of comparison between Kant's conception of intuition and the contemporary accounts of non-conceptual content, encountered in the writings of G. Evans, Ch. Peacocke, F. Dretske, T. Crane, M. G. F. Martin, and others. Following R. Aquila's reading of Kant's conception of representation, the author argues that intuition (Anschauung, intuitus) provides the most basic form of intentionality - pre-conceptual reference to objects, which underlies the acts of conceptualization and judgment. The book advances an interpretation of Kant's theory of experience in the light of such questions as: Does conscious perceptual experience of objects require that subjects possess concepts of these objects? Do the contents of experience differ from the contents of beliefs or judgments? And if they do, what accounts for this difference? These questions take us to the most puzzling philosophical topic of the relation between mind and world. Anna Tomaszewska argues that this relation does not involve conceptual capacities alone but also, on the most basic level of perceptual experience, pre-cognitive "sensible intuition," enabling relatedness to objects that remains uninformed by concepts. In a nutshell, on her interpretation, Kant can be taken to subscribe to the view that perceptual cognition does not have rational underpinnings. 606 $aPHILOSOPHY / General$2bisacsh 610 $aKant, conceptualism, non-conceptualism, content of perception, embodied cognition. 615 7$aPHILOSOPHY / General. 676 $a193 700 $aTomaszewska$b Anna.$0803020 702 $aMichalska$b Anna 702 $aAdamski$b P. Christian 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910135394603321 996 $aThe contents of perceptual experience$91946305 997 $aUNINA