LEADER 00897nam0-22002891i-450- 001 990006556020403321 005 20001010 035 $a000655602 035 $aFED01000655602 035 $a(Aleph)000655602FED01 035 $a000655602 100 $a20001010d--------km-y0itay50------ba 101 0 $aita 105 $ay-------001yy 200 1 $aORBIS geographicus 1992$eworld directory of geography$eannuaire geographique du monde$f93$fEdited on behalf of by R. Abler ... (ed altri)$gin cooperation with the International Geographical Union 205 $a7. ed. 210 $aStuttgart$cF. Steiner$d1992. 215 $aXVI, 624 p.$d25 cm 702 1$aAbler,$bRonald 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990006556020403321 952 $aVII A 405$b18327$fFSPBC 959 $aFSPBC 996 $aORBIS geographicus 1992$9618476 997 $aUNINA DB $aGEN01 LEADER 02878nam 2200565 450 001 9910788158303321 005 20230803032429.0 010 $a3-89785-949-1 024 7 $a10.30965/9783897859494 035 $a(CKB)2670000000598877 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001463150 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12560801 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001463150 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11419935 035 $a(PQKB)10067598 035 $a(nllekb)BRILL9783897859494 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5055734 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6518069 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL5055734 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL733997 035 $a(OCoLC)1011164954 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL6518069 035 $a(OCoLC)1243547608 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000598877 100 $a20211015d2013 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurun| uuuua 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aI know $emodal epistemology and scepticism /$fWolfgang Freitag 210 1$aMu?nster :$cMentis,$d[2013] 210 4$dİ2013 215 $a1 online resource 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a3-89785-774-X 311 $a1-336-02711-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 185-191) and index. 330 $aScepticism, the view that knowledge is impossible, threatens our conception of ourselves as epistemic subjects as much as it endangers our conception of the external world. The book develops a modal account of knowledge and provides an answer to scepticism based on a detailed examination of the main sceptical argument. It discusses prominent contemporary theories of knowledge, in particular safety and sensitivity theories, and shows that they cannot handle Gettier-type examples of a new kind. An alternative analysis of knowledge in terms of relevantly normal possibilities is developed. The sceptical argument addressed aims to show that we cannot know ordinary things because we cannot rule out that we are in a sceptical scenario. Classical responses, like dogmatism, non-closure theories, and epistemic contextualism, are explored and rejected as unnecessary for a refutation of the sceptical argument. A detailed investigation reveals, first, that the failure to know that we are not in a sceptical scenario does not conflict with ordinary knowledge, but only with knowledge that we know, and, second, that we can indeed know that we are not in a sceptical scenario. It is therefore claimed not only that we know, but also that we know that we know. 606 $aModality (Theory of knowledge) 615 0$aModality (Theory of knowledge) 676 $a123 700 $aFreitag$b Wolfgang$f1972-$01489091 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788158303321 996 $aI know$93709628 997 $aUNINA LEADER 01275nam a2200313 i 4500 001 991002316399707536 005 20250922115408.0 008 000220s1988 it er 001 e ita 020 $a8815019383 035 $ab10991050-39ule_inst 035 $aPARLA159533$9ExL 040 $aDip.to Filosofia$bita 082 04$a306.42 100 1 $aElias, Norbert$0118152 245 10$aCoinvolgimento e distacco :$bsaggi di sociologia della conoscenza /$cNorbert Elias 260 $aBologna :$bIl mulino,$cc1988 300 $a320 p. ;$c22 cm 490 0 $aSaggi ;$v341 500 $aTrad. di Giuseppina Panzieri 500 $aTit. orig.: Engagement und Distanzierung 650 4$aConoscenza$xSociologia 907 $a.b10991050$b23-02-17$c28-06-02 912 $a991002316399707536 945 $aLE015 150 - 6$g1$i2015000066787$lle007$nLE015-0304$o-$pE19.63$q-$rl$s-$t0$u1$v1$w1$x0$y.i12508895$z05-05-03 945 $aLE005IF XLIX E 15$g1$i2005000241116$lle005$o-$pE0.00$q-$rl$s-$t0$u5$v1$w5$x0$y.i1110563x$z28-06-02 945 $aLE024 SOC/A SR I 5$g1$i2024000026677$lle021$nex DUSS$o-$pE0.00$q-$rl$s-$t0$u0$v0$w0$x0$y.i11995087$z26-11-02 996 $aCoinvolgimento e distacco$9133959 997 $aUNISALENTO 998 $ale007$ale005$ale021$b01-01-00$cm$da$e-$fita$git$h0$i1