LEADER 01495nam2 2200349 i 450 001 SUN0123596 005 20200415122402.629 010 $d0.00 017 70$2N$a9783319487052 100 $a20190924d2017 |0engc50 ba 101 $aeng 102 $aCH 105 $a|||| ||||| 200 1 $a2: *Emerging Materials and Structures$fPanagiotis Dimitrakis editor 205 $aCham : Springer, 2017 210 $aV$d211 p.$cill. ; 24 cm 215 $aPubblicazione in formato elettronico 461 1$1001SUN0123595$12001 $a*Charge-Trapping Non-Volatile Memories$fPanagiotis Dimitrakis editor$v2$1210 $aCham$cSpringer$d2017$1215 $avoll.$cill.$d24 cm. 620 $aCH$dCham$3SUNL001889 676 $a620.11$cMateriali dell'ingegneria$v22 676 $a620.5$cNanotecnologia$v22 676 $a620.1$cScienza dei materiali$v22 676 $a621.3815$cComponenti e circuiti$v22 676 $a621.381$cElettronica. Microelettronica. Elettronica molecolare$v22 702 1$aDimitrakis$b, Panagiotis$3SUNV095065 712 $aSpringer$3SUNV000178$4650 801 $aIT$bSOL$c20200921$gRICA 856 4 $uhttps://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-319-48705-2#toc 912 $aSUN0123596 950 $aUFFICIO DI BIBLIOTECA DEL DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE E TECNOLOGIE AMBIENTALI BIOLOGICHE E FARMACEUTICHE$d17CONS e-book 2111 $e17BIB2111 130 20190924 996 $aEmerging Materials and Structures$91561664 997 $aUNICAMPANIA LEADER 04115nam 2200649 a 450 001 9910788669603321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-283-89622-2 010 $a0-8122-0522-7 024 7 $a10.9783/9780812205220 035 $a(CKB)3240000000065366 035 $a(OCoLC)786908250 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10642650 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000626281 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11385966 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000626281 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10629260 035 $a(PQKB)10960877 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse17656 035 $a(DE-B1597)449400 035 $a(OCoLC)979740938 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780812205220 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3441898 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10642650 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL420872 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3441898 035 $a(EXLCZ)993240000000065366 100 $a20110728d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe Al Qaeda factor$b[electronic resource] $eplots against the West /$fMitchell D. Silber 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aPhiladelphia $cUniversity of Pennsylvania Press$dc2012 215 $a1 online resource (367 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-8122-4402-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $apt. I. Al Qaeda "command and control" plots -- pt. II. Al Qaeda "suggested/endorsed" plots -- pt. III. Al Qaeda "inspired" plots. 330 $aThe horrific and devastating events of September 11, 2001 changed the world's perception of Al Qaeda. What had been considered a small band of revolutionary terrorists capable only of attacking Western targets in the Middle East and Africa suddenly demonstrated an ability to strike globally with enormous impact. Subsequent plots perpetuated the impression of Al Qaeda as a highly organized and rigidly controlled organization with recruiters, operatives, and sleeper cells in the West who could be activated on command.We now know, however, that the role of Al Qaeda in global jihadist plots has varied significantly over time. New York Police Department terrorism expert Mitchell D. Silber argues that to comprehend the threat posed by the transnational jihad movement, we must have a greater and more nuanced understanding of the dynamics behind Al Qaeda plots. In The Al Qaeda Factor he examines sixteen Al Qaeda-associated plots and attacks, from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing to today. For each case, he probes primary sources and applies a series of questions to determine the precise involvement of Al Qaeda. What connects radicalized groups in the West to the core Al Qaeda organization in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan? Does one of the plotters have to attend an Al Qaeda training camp or meet with an Al Qaeda trainer, or can they simply be inspired by Al Qaeda ideology? Further analysis examines the specifics of Al Qaeda's role in the inspiration, formation, membership, and organization of terrorist groups. Silber also identifies potential points of vulnerability, which may raise the odds of thwarting future terrorist attacks in the West.The Al Qaeda Factor demonstrates that the role of Al Qaeda is very limited even in plots with direct involvement. Silber finds that in the majority of cases, individuals went to Al Qaeda seeking aid or training, but even then there was limited direct command and control of the terrorists' activities-a sobering conclusion that demonstrates that even the destruction of Al Qaeda's core would not stop Al Qaeda plots. 606 $aTerrorism$zUnited States$vCase studies 606 $aTerrorism$zEurope$vCase studies 610 $aPolitical Science. 610 $aPublic Policy. 615 0$aTerrorism 615 0$aTerrorism 676 $a363.325094 700 $aSilber$b Mitchell D$01516215 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788669603321 996 $aThe Al Qaeda factor$93752542 997 $aUNINA