LEADER 01201nam 2200349 450 001 000005838 005 20070503173300.0 100 $a20001109d1916----km-y0itay0103----ba 101 0 $aeng 102 $aUS 200 1 $aWitte arrives$ea novel$fby Elias Tobenkin$gwith a frontispiece by J. Henry 200 1 $a1 $n0003835 210 $aNew York$cStokes$dc1916 215 $a304 p., [1] c. di tav.$d19 cm. 676 $a813.52$v(20 ed.)$9Narrativa americana in inglese. 1900-1945 700 1$aTobenkin,$bElias$f<1882-1963>$0439637 801 0$aIT$bUniversità della Basilicata - B.I.A.$gRICA$2unimarc 912 $a000005838 996 $aWitte arrives$974175 997 $aUNIBAS BAS $aMONLET BAS $aMONOGR BAS $aLETTERE CAT $aGENOVESE$b01$c20001109$lBAS01$h1654 CAT $c20050601$lBAS01$h1753 CAT $abatch$b01$c20050718$lBAS01$h1048 CAT $c20050718$lBAS01$h1108 CAT $c20050718$lBAS01$h1138 CAT $c20050718$lBAS01$h1152 CAT $aBATCH$b00$c20070503$lBAS01$h1733 FMT Z30 -1$lBAS01$LBAS01$mBOOK$1BASA1$APolo Storico-Umanistico$2GEN$BCollezione generale$3FP/4699$64699$5L4699$820001109$f02$FPrestabile Generale LEADER 03049nam 2200589 450 001 9910822888203321 005 20201117192101.0 010 $a1-5017-5192-1 024 7 $a10.1515/9781501751936 035 $a(CKB)5590000000002801 035 $a(OCoLC)1140380459 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse85325 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6010763 035 $a(DE-B1597)545609 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781501751936 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0002535096 035 $a(OCoLC)1224278055 035 $a(EXLCZ)995590000000002801 100 $a20210416e20212020 fy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|||||||nn|n 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aHow to prevent coups d'e?tat $ecounterbalancing and regime survival /$fErica De Bruin$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aIthaca :$cCornell University Press,$d2021. 215 $a1 online resource (1 online resource) 225 1 $aCornell scholarship online 300 $aPreviously issued in print: 2020. 311 $a1-5017-5191-3 311 $a1-5017-5193-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIntroduction: Preventing Coups d'etat -- The Logic of Counterbalancing -- Counterbalancing and Coup Failure -- How Counterbalancing Works: Testing the Causal Mechanisms -- An Effective Deterrent? Counterbalancing and Coup Attempts -- Challenges to Building Coercive Institutions -- How Coups d'etat Escalate to Civil War -- Conclusion: Coercive Institutions and Regime Survival. 330 8 $aWhen rulers use presidential guards, militarized police, and militia to counterbalance the regular military, efforts to oust them from power via coups d'e?tat are less likely to succeed. Even as counterbalancing helps to prevent successful interventions, however, the resentment that it generates within the regular military can provoke new coup attempts. And because counterbalancing changes how soldiers and police perceive the costs and benefits of a successful overthrow, it can create incentives for protracted fighting that result in the escalation of a coup into full-blown civil war. Drawing on an original dataset of state security forces in 110 countries over a span of fifty years, as well as case studies of coup attempts in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, the book sheds light on how counterbalancing affects regime survival. 410 0$aCornell scholarship online. 606 $aCoups d'e?tat$xPrevention 606 $aCivil war$xPrevention 606 $aPolitical leadership 606 $aCivil-military relations 615 0$aCoups d'e?tat$xPrevention. 615 0$aCivil war$xPrevention. 615 0$aPolitical leadership. 615 0$aCivil-military relations. 676 $a327.112 686 $aMD 8600$2rvk 700 $aDe Bruin$b Erica$f1982-$01720886 801 0$bStDuBDS 801 1$bStDuBDS 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910822888203321 996 $aHow to prevent coups d'e?tat$94119957 997 $aUNINA