

1.	Record Nr.	UNISOBLAEC00022197
	Titolo	Der Anschnitt
	Lingua di pubblicazione	Non definito
	Formato	Materiale a stampa
	Livello bibliografico	Collezione
2.	Record Nr.	UNINA9910824068303321
	Autore	Taliaferro Jeffrey W.
	Titolo	Balancing risks : great power intervention in th periphery // Jeffrey W. Taliaferro
	Pubbl/distr/stampa	Ithaca, New York ; ; London : , : Cornell University Press, , [2004] ©2004
	ISBN	1-5017-2025-2
	Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (329 pages)
	Collana	Cornell studies in security affairs
	Classificazione	15.59 89.79
	Disciplina	909.82
	Soggetti	World politics - 20th century Great Britain Foreign relations 1901-1910 Japan Foreign relations 1912-1945 United States Foreign relations 1945-1953
	Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
	Formato	Materiale a stampa
	Livello bibliografico	Monografia
	Note generali	Includes index.
	Nota di contenuto	Front matter -- CONTENTS -- Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Note on Translations, Romanization, and Stylistic Conventions -- 1. Power Politics and the Balance of Risk -- 2. Explaining Great Power Involvement in the Periphery -- 3. Germany and the 1905 Morocco Crisis -- 4. Japan and the 1940-41 War Decisions -- 5. The United States and the Korean War (1950-51) -- 6. The Limits of Great Power Intervention in the Periphery -- 7. Implications of the Argument -- Notes -- Index

Great powers often initiate risky military and diplomatic interventions in far-off, peripheral regions that pose no direct threat to them, risking direct confrontation with rivals in strategically inconsequential places. Why do powerful countries behave in a way that leads to entrapment in prolonged, expensive, and self-defeating conflicts? Jeffrey W. Taliaferro suggests that such interventions are driven by the refusal of senior officials to accept losses in their state's relative power, international status, or prestige. Instead of cutting their losses, leaders often continue to invest blood and money in failed excursions into the periphery. Their policies may seem to be driven by rational concerns about power and security, but Taliaferro deems them to be at odds with the master explanation of political realism. Taliaferro constructs a "balance-of-risk" theory of foreign policy that draws on defensive realism (in international relations) and prospect theory (in psychology). He illustrates the power of this new theory in several case narratives: Germany's initiation and escalation of the 1905 and 1911 Moroccan crises, the United States' involvement in the Korean War in 1950-52, and Japan's entanglement in the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937-40 and its decisions for war with the U.S. in 1940-41.
