1. Record Nr. UNINA990003601590403321
Autore Parsons, Talcott <1902-1979>

Titolo La strutture dell'azione sociali. / T. Pa rsons.

Pubbl/distr/stampa Bologna: s.e., 1962

Locazione DECSE

Collocazione SE 09.010.010-

Lingua di pubblicazione Italiano

Formato Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico Monografia

Record Nr. UNINA9910303432903321

Autore Benovsky Jiri

Titolo Mind and Matter: Panpsychism, Dual-Aspect Monism, and the

Combination Problem / / by Jiri Benovsky

Pubbl/distr/stampa Cham:,: Springer International Publishing:,: Imprint: Springer,,

2018

ISBN 3-030-05633-3

Edizione [1st ed. 2018.]

Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (58 pages)

Collana SpringerBriefs in Philosophy, , 2211-4548

Disciplina 141

Soggetti Philosophy of mind

Philosophy of Mind

Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese

Formato Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico Monografia

Nota di contenuto Chapter 1 – Pan-proto-dual-aspect-psychism -- Chapter 2 –

Theoretical background, the mind-body problem -- Chapter 3 – Dual-aspect monism -- Chapter 4 – The combination problem(s) -- Chapter 5 – The subject of experience -- Chapter 6 – Eliminativism -- Chapter

8 - Concluding remarks.

Sommario/riassunto In this book, the author takes a stand for a variant of panpsychism as

being the best solution available to the mind-body problem. More

exactly, he defends a view that can be labelled 'dual-aspect-panproto-psychism'. Panpsychism claims that mentality is ubiquitous to reality, and in combination with dual-aspect monism it claims that anything, from fundamental particles to rocks, trees, and human animals, has two aspects: a physical aspect and a mental aspect. In short, the view is that the nature of reality is 'phental' (physicalmental). But this does not mean, according to the author, that rocks and photons think or have conscious experiences, in the sense in which human animals have experiences. This is where pan-proto-psychism enters the picture as being a better theoretical option, where the mental aspects of fundamental particles, rocks, and trees are not experiential. Many hard questions arise here. In this book, Benovsky focuses on the combination problem: in short, how do tiny mental aspects of fundamental particles combine to yield macro-phenomenal conscious experiences, such as your complex experience when you enjoy a great gastronomic meal? What makes the guestion even harder is that the combination problem is not just one problem, but rather a family of various combination issues and worries. Benovsky offers a general strategy to deal with these combination problems and focuses on one in particular - namely, the worry concerning the existence of subjects of experience. Indeed, if standard panpsychism were true, we would need an explanation of how tiny micro-subjects combine into a macro-subject like a human person. And if panprotopsychism is true, it has to explain how a subject of experience can arise from proto-micromental aspects of reality. Benovsky shows that understanding the nature of subjectivity in terms of the growingly familiar notion of mineness in combination with an eliminativist view of the self, allows us to have a coherent picture, where this type of combination problem is avoided, without throwing the baby out with the bathwater. .

3. Record Nr. UNISOBE600200069534 Autore Ferrari, Giuseppe Michele Scritti varj / G. M. Ferrari Titolo Roma, : Società Editrice Dante Alighieri Pubbl/distr/stampa Descrizione fisica v.; 21 cm Lingua di pubblicazione Italiano Formato Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia