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| Autore | Kalpaxis, Athanasios E. |
| Titolo | Hemiteles : akzidentelle Unfertigkeit und "Bossen-Stil" in der griechischen Baukunst / von Thanassis E. Kalpaxis |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Mainz am Rhein : Philipp von Zabern, c1986 |
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| Autore | Annen Kurt |
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| Altri autori (Persone) | MoersLuc |
| Soggetti | Economic assistance
Flow of funds
Budgeting
Exports and Imports
Finance: General
Social Services and Welfare
Poverty and Homelessness
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Foreign Aid
International Fiscal Issues
International Public Goods
National Budget
Budget Systems
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: General |

General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
Government Policy
Provision and Effects of Welfare Program
International economics
Budgeting & financial management
Poverty & precarity
Finance
Social welfare & social services
Foreign aid
Budget planning and preparation
Poverty
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Nota di contenuto

Cover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size
2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity
3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil Index

Sommario/riassunto

This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativity, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation.
