

1. Record Nr.	UNISOBVAN0085473
Autore	Meyer, Kenneth R.
Titolo	Introduction to Hamiltonian dynamical systems and N-body problem / Kenneth R. Meyer, Glen R. Hall, Dan Offin
Pubbl/distr/stampa	New York, : Springer, 2009
Titolo uniforme	Introduction to Hamiltonian dynamical systems and N-body problem
ISBN	978-03-87097-23-7
Edizione	[2. ed]
Descrizione fisica	XII, 399 p. ; 24 cm
Altri autori (Persone)	Hall, Glen R. Offin, Dan
Soggetti	70F15 - Celestial mechanics [MSC 2020] 70Hxx - Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics [MSC 2020] 37N05 - Dynamical systems in classical and celestial mechanics [MSC 2020]
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia

2. Record Nr.	UNISALENTO991001542889707536
Autore	Beneduce, Roberto
Titolo	Frontiere dell'identità e della memoria : etnopsichiatria e migrazioni in un mondo creolo / Roberto Beneduce ; con un saggio di Mahfoud Boucebci
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Milano : Angeli, 2004
ISBN	884645457X
Edizione	[Ed. riveduta e ampliata]
Descrizione fisica	314 p. ; 23 cm
Collana	Scienze e salute ; 5
Altri autori (Persone)	Boucebci, Mahfoud
Disciplina	362.20
Soggetti	Immigrati - Assistenza psichiatrica
Lingua di pubblicazione	Italiano
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia

3. Record Nr.	UNINA9910962131103321
Autore	Maechler Andrea
Titolo	Who Disciplines Bank Managers? // Andrea Maechler, Klaus Schaeck, Martin Cihak, Stéphanie Marie Stolz
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009
ISBN	9786612844591 9781462311361 1462311369 9781452783352 1452783357 9781451874174 1451874170 9781282844599 1282844598
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (76 p.)
Collana	IMF Working Papers
Altri autori (Persone)	CihakMartin SchaeckKlaus StolzStéphanie Marie
Disciplina	338.23178
Soggetti	Banks and banking Corporate governance Bank soundness Banking Banks and Banking Banks Corporate Finance and Governance: General Corporate Finance Corporate finance Corporations--Finance Crisis management Deposit insurance Depository Institutions Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models Discrete Regressors Econometric models Econometrics & economic statistics Econometrics Economic & financial crises & disasters Finance

Finance: General  
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation  
Financial Risk Management  
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation  
Logit models  
Micro Finance Institutions  
Mortgages  
Proportions  
United States

Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto	Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Related Literature and Hypothesis; III. Methodology and Data; A. Methodology; B. Variable Selection; C. Dataset; 1. Histogram of Total Assets; 1. Descriptive Statistics, Differences of Means and Medians, and Correlations; IV. Bank Performance Prior to Executive Turnover; 2. Percentage Changes in Bank Performance Prior to Executive Turnover; V. Multivariate Analysis; 3. Conditional Logit Models for Different Sources of Discipline; 4. Key Variables of Interest by Percentile of Z-Score 5. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Treatment Group) 6. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Treatment and Control Group); 7. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Matching on Propensity Scores, Treatment, and Control Group); VI. Conclusions; I. Measuring Bank Soundness Using the Z-Score; II. Overview of Data and Sources; III. Turnovers in Small and Medium Sized U.S. Banks 1990-2007; IV. Robustness Checks; References; Footnotes
Sommario/riassunto	We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U. S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a 'laboratory setting' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders' ability to fire an executive. Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter value, and holds high levels of subordinated debt. We only find limited evidence that forced turnovers improve bank performance.