1.	Record Nr.	UNISALENTO991004169219707536
	Autore	Batany, Jean
	Titolo	Français medieval : textes choisis, commentaires linguistiques, commentaires litteraires, chronologie phonetique / Jean Batany
	Pubbl/distr/stampa	Paris : Bordas, 1972
	ISBN	2040157654
	Descrizione fisica	319 p. ; 22 cm
	Collana	Études
	Soggetti	Lingua francese antica - Studi
	Lingua di pubblicazione	Francese
	Formato	Materiale a stampa
	Livello bibliografico	Monografia
2.	Record Nr.	UNISALENTO991001448109707536
	Autore	Pamuk, Sevket
	Titolo	The Mediterranean response to globalization before 1950 / edited by Sevket Pamuk and Jeffrey G. Williamson
	Pubbl/distr/stampa	London : Routledge, 2000
	ISBN	041522425X
	Descrizione fisica	xvi, 430 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
	Collana	Routledge explorations in economic history ; 18
	Altri autori (Persone)	Williamson, Jeffrey G.
	Disciplina	338.91
	Soggetti	Globalizzazione Mediterraneo Regioni - Politica economica Mediterraneo Regioni - Relazioni
	Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
	Formato	Materiale a stampa
	Livello bibliografico	Monografia
	Note generali	Includes bibliographical references and index.

3.	Record Nr.	UNINA9910703320203321
	Autore	Rogoff Kenneth
	Titolo	Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles / / Kenneth Rogoff, Anne Sibert
	Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cambridge, Mass, : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1986 [Washington, D.C.] : , : [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System], , [1985]
	Descrizione fisica	1 online resource : illustrations (black and white);
	Collana	NBER working paper series ; no. w1838
	Altri autori (Persone)	SibertAnne
	Soggetti	Elections - Economic aspects
	Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
	Formato	Materiale a stampa
	Livello bibliografico	Monografia
	Note generali	February 1986.
	Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references (pages 35-36).
	Sommario/riassunto	There is an extensive empirical literature on political business cycles, but its theoretical foundations are grounded in pre-rational expectations macroeconomic theory. Here we show that electoral cycles in taxes, government spending and money growth can be modeled as an equilibrium signaling process. The cycleis driven by temporary information asymmetries which can arise if, for example,the government has more current information on its performance in providing for national defense. Incumbents cheat least when their private informationis either extremely favorable or extremely unfavorable. An exogenous increase in the incumbent partyts popularity does not necessarily imply a damped policy cycle.