

1. Record Nr.	UNISA996393042003316
Autore	Amyraut Moise <1596-1664.>
Titolo	A treatise concerning religions [[electronic resource]] : in refutation of the opinion which accounts all indifferent· Wherein is also evinc'd the necessity of a particular revelation, and the verity and preeminence of the Christian religion above the pagan, Mahometan, and Jewish rationally demonstrated. // Rendred into English out of the French copy of Moyses Amyraldus late professor of divinity at Saumur in France
Pubbl/distr/stampa	London, : Printed by M. Simmons for Will. Nealand bookseller in Cambridge and are to be sold there and at the sign of the Crown in Duck-lane, [London], 1660
Descrizione fisica	[24], 539, [1] p
Soggetti	Apologetics Religions
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	A translation of: Traitte des religions. Title page in red and black. The first leaf bears a quotation from Lactantius. Annotation on Thomason copy: "July". Reproduction of the original in the British Library.
Sommario/riassunto	eebo-0018

2. Record Nr.	UNINA9910779176703321
Autore	Marshall Robert C. <1956->
Titolo	The economics of collusion : cartels and bidding rings // Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, ©2012
ISBN	0-262-30073-7 1-280-49893-5 9786613594167 0-262-30150-4
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (315 p.)
Disciplina	338.8/2
Soggetti	Price fixing Cartels Competition
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Nota di contenuto	<p>""Contents""; ""Preface""; ""Chapter 1. Introduction ""; ""1.1 Motivating Example""; ""1.2 Collusion within Portera€?s Five Forces""; ""1.3 Difficulties of Collusion""; ""1.4 Environments Requiring Explicit Collusion""; ""1.5 Lingering Price Effects of Explicit Collusion""; ""1.6 Price Formation Process""; ""1.7 Economic Rationale for the Illegality of Explicit Collusion""; ""1.8 Cartel Detection""; ""1.9 Outline of the Book""; ""1.10 Appendix: Factors Affecting the Sustainability of Tacit Collusion""; ""Part I. Collusion in Practice""; ""Chapter 2. Narrative of a Cartel""</p> <p>""2.1 The Story Begins""""2.2 Initiation of the Cartel""; ""2.3 Market Share Division""; ""2.4 Price Increases and Announcements""; ""2.5 Sales Force Issues""; ""2.6 Redistributions""; ""2.7 Questions and Answers""; ""Chapter 3. Narrative of a Bidding Ring""; ""3.1 Preamble""; ""3.2 The Instruction Begins""; ""3.3 Two Motivations for the Ring""; ""3.4 Ring Logistics""; ""3.5 Ring Membership""; ""3.6 Auctioneera€?s Response""; ""3.7 Implementation of Sidepayments""; ""3.8 Questions and Answers""; ""Chapter 4. Narrative of Cartel Detection""; ""4.1 Preamble""; ""4.2 The Seminar Begins""</p>

""4.3 Taxonomy of Cartel Actions""""4.4 Economic Evidence of Collusion""; ""4.5 Questions and Answers""; ""Part II. Economics of Cartels""; ""Chapter 5. Suppression of Rivalry by Cartels""; ""5.1 Basics""; ""5.2 Buyer Resistance""; ""5.3 Model of Price Competition without Buyer Resistance""; ""5.4 Collusive Outcomes""; ""5.5 Incentives for Cheating""; ""5.6 Conclusion""; ""Chapter 6. Implementation of Collusion by Cartels""; ""6.1 The Central Cartel Problem and the Solution""; ""6.2 Pricing Structures""; ""6.3 Allocation Structures""; ""6.4 Enforcement Structures""; ""6.5 Conclusion""
 ""6.6 Appendix: Third-Party Facilitation""""Chapter 7. Beyond the Suppression of Within-cartel Rivalry""; ""7.1 Sharing Mutually Beneficial Investments""; ""7.2 A Dominant Firm versus a Cartel Acting as a Dominant Firm""; ""7.3 Direct Actions against Noncartel Firms""; ""7.4 Perimeter Forces""; ""7.5 Sixth Force of Government""; ""7.6 Conclusion""; ""7.7 Appendix: Antitrust Exemptions""; ""Part III. Economics of Bidding Rings""; ""Chapter 8. Suppression of Interbidder Rivalry by Rings""; ""8.1 Role of Auctions and Procurements in Price Discovery""; ""8.2 Suppression of Rivalry at an Auction""
 ""8.3 Ring Composition""""8.4 Effects of Auction Format and Ring Size""; ""8.5 Conclusion""; ""8.6 Appendix A: Numerical Example of Leakage at a Sealed-Bid Auction""; ""8.7 Appendix B: Numerical Example of Membership and Participation at a Sealed-Bid Auction""; ""Chapter 9. Implementation of Collusion by Rings""; ""9.1 Rings versus Cartels""; ""9.2 Ring Secret Deviations""; ""9.3 Ring Pricing Structures and Seller Resistance""; ""9.4 Ring Allocation Structures""; ""9.5 Ring Enforcement Structures""; ""9.6 Ring Mechanisms for Standard Auction Types""; ""9.7 Efficiency of Allocations""
 ""9.8 Conclusion""

Sommario/riassunto

Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In *The Economics of Collusion*, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts--fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases--offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entree to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks.
