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Nota di contenuto	Cover Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Perspectives on workplace injury -- Purpose of this book -- Preventing workplace injury -- Compensating workplace injury -- Major conclusions -- One Employment Relationships in Canada -- Employment in a capitalist economy -- The labour market and the wage-rate bargain -- The labour process and the wage-effort bargain -- Power and rules in employment -- The common law -- Changing definitions of work -- Workplace safety and the profit motive -- Compensation through the courts -- Alternatives to litigation -- Do employers intentionally transfer costs? -- Conclusion -- Two Preventing Workplace Injury -- Development of occupational health and safety in Canada -- Perspectives on risk -- Market model of occupational health and safety -- Inevitability and the careless worker -- The social construction of

accidents -- Pressure for state regulation -- The Factory Acts -- Injury compensation -- Why workers' compensation? -- Partial self-regulation -- Hoggs Hollow and Elliot Lake -- The external responsibility system -- The internal responsibility system -- Canada's OHS system today -- Duties and obligations -- Health and safety standards -- External responsibility system -- Internal system and the three rights -- Partnership model and incentives -- Conclusion -- Three Critique of OHS in Canada -- Recognizing injury and hazards -- How many injuries? -- Who gets hurt affects injury recognition -- The type of injury and its cost also affect recognition -- Employers may impede injury recognition -- The social construction of injury and hazards -- Employer tactics in contesting injury recognition -- Perpetuating the careless worker myth -- Identifying occupational cancer -- Preventing occupational cancer -- Constructing cancer as a non-issue. Conceptual models of injury -- Limits to the biomedical model -- Regulating workplace hazards -- Approaches to regulation -- Limits on regulation -- The internal responsibility system -- Knowledge is power? -- Joint health and safety committees -- The right to refuse -- Employer responses to refusals -- Refusal as a weak right -- Effectiveness of the internal system -- Exposure levels and threshold limit values -- Are exposure levels safe? -- Why do exposure levels always go down? -- Inspections and inspectors -- Bias in inspections -- The effect of orders -- Prosecution and fines -- Partnerships and the mantra of "safety pays" -- Creating evidence of safe workplaces -- Disabling injury rate and severity -- Measures as conceptual technologies -- Why use inadequate measures? -- Conclusion -- Four Political Economy of Preventing Workplace Injury -- Why regulate ineffectively? -- Context of state action -- Regulation of workplace injury -- Inadequate standards -- Regulation of hazards in the workplace -- Ignorant and reckless? -- Social sanction of workplace injury -- Ineffective penalties -- Why regulate ineffectively? -- How is this legitimized? -- Injury in the new economy -- Work intensification -- Precarious employment increases risks -- What do intensification and precarious employment tell us? -- Conclusion -- Five Compensation of Workplace Injury -- Workers' compensation in Canada -- Overview of workers' compensation -- Development of workers' compensation in Canada -- Workers' compensation as a compromise -- Injury recognition revisited -- Determining compensability -- "Arises and occurs" -- Balance of probabilities and presumptions -- Politics of injury recognition -- Work-related musculoskeletal disorders and causation -- Occupational diseases -- Limiting liability: Psychological injuries -- Chronic pain syndrome -- Conclusion. Six Worker Benefits and Claims Management -- Earnings-loss benefits -- Deeming earnings -- Permanent disabilities and the dual-award system -- Other benefits -- Vocational rehabilitation and early return to work -- Is early return to work a good idea? -- The political economy of ERTW -- Medical services -- Fatalities -- Funding workers' compensation -- Employer premiums -- Rising premiums -- Moral hazard -- Experience-rating schemes -- Effect of experience rating on injury frequency -- Effect of experience rating on injury duration -- Rationale for experience rating -- Conclusion -- Seven Managing Workers via Injury Compensation -- Claim adjudication and administration -- Impeding a shared understanding -- Mobilizing workers -- Role of trade unions -- Appeals -- Internal reviews and external appeals -- How appeal processes advantage employers -- Adversarialism in appeals -- Political economy of appeals -- Impact on workers -- Privatization and abolishment -- Argument for returning to tort -- Operation of tort-based compensation -- Comparing tort and

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Sommario/riassunto

Workplace injuries are common, avoidable, and unacceptable. The Political Economy of Workplace Injury in Canada reveals how employers and governments engage in ineffective injury prevention efforts, intervening only when necessary to maintain the standard legitimacy. Dr. Bob Barnettson sheds light on this faulty system, highlighting the way in which employers create dangerous work environments yet pour billions of dollars into compensation and treatment. Examining this dynamic clarifies the way in which production costs are passed on to workers in the form of workplace injuries.
